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This thesis uses Simone de Beauvoir’s analysis of woman’s immanence in the new 
edition of The Second Sex, translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, 
as a lens to analyze six mainstream Hollywood films in order to determine whether any 
elements of her description are visible in popular films made both during and after the 
implementation of the Hollywood Production Code (1930-1960). Applying Beauvoir’s 
analyses to film as a critical lens helps explain why representations of women that have 
endured for centuries continue to appeal to mainstream American audiences. Beauvoir’s 
analyses in The Second Sex detail the impact these representations may have on how 
women think of themselves and on their actual lived experiences.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is, as Bauer (2004) asserts, “universally 
acknowledged as the founding text of contemporary feminism” (115). Though not 
initially concerned with women’s issues, as Beauvoir prepared to write a collection of 
memoirs in 1946, she realized that she could not speak about her life without first 
acknowledging the most crucial aspect of her situation: “I became aware with a sort of 
surprise that the first thing I had to say was this: I am a woman” (Bauer, 121). The 
Second Sex, one of the most pivotal works of reflexivity and an exhaustive account of 
women’s situation in history, biology, psychoanalysis, mythology, literature, and lived 
experience is the product of Beauvoir’s realization of what it means to first declare that 
one is a woman in order to speak of one’s life.  
The first English translation of The Second Sex, published in 1953, is notoriously 
flawed for a variety of reasons, one of which is the choice of the translator:  
It is the work of Howard Parshley, a retired professor of human biology at Smith 
College, who was commissioned by Alfred Knopf essentially to ratchet down the   
difficulty of The Second Sex for a mainstream American audience and to squeeze   
its two volumes into one book that, with luck, would become the next ‘Studies in   
the Psychology of Sex,’ the scandalous series of Havelock Ellis. (Bauer, 2004) 
 
Though Parshley was intensely devoted to the project of translating The Second Sex, he 
lacked a background in both French literature and philosophy. Secondly, as Simons’ 
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(1983) study demonstrates, seventy-five pages of the original text were cut, most of 
which concerned women’s descriptions of their lived experience:  
None of the omissions is any way noted. Sometimes Parshley cuts out the end of   
one sentence and splices it on to the end of another one, a paragraph away. He   
appears to get bored whenever Beauvoir starts documenting actual women’s reports  
of their experience and so is prone to cut them out. (Bauer, 120) 
 
In 2009, a new English translation of The Second Sex was published that restores all of 
the omitted material in Parshley’s translation. As Judith Thurman notes in her 
introduction to the new translation, though Parshley lacked a background in both 
philosophy and French literature, he also lacked something perhaps even more 
fundamental for a seminal work of modern feminism, “a second X chromosome” 
(Thurman, xiii).  
The new edition is translated by Constance Borde, a longtime resident of France and 
teacher of English at Sciences Po, and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, also a longtime 
resident of France and retired teacher of American literature at Sciences Po. In addition to 
possessing a “second x chromosome,” Borde and Malovany-Chevallier also preserve 
Beauvoir’s original punctuation and unique style of prose and correct the two major flaws 
of Parshley’s translation. The new edition of The Second Sex affords the opportunity to 
revisit Beauvoir’s work on women’s situation and lived experience and to employ it as a 
critical lens through which to examine representations of women in American culture and 
film.  
In this thesis, I compare Beauvoir’s analysis of woman’s immanence in The Second 
Sex to six mainstream Hollywood films in order to determine whether any elements of 
her description are visible in popular films made both during and after the Hollywood 
 
 
3 
 
Production Code (1930-1960). I ask whether elements of Beauvoir’s descriptions in the 
chapter “Women’s Situation and Character” in The Second Sex are visible in 
representations of women’s roles and characters in popular films made both during and 
after the Hollywood Production Code.  
The new edition of The Second Sex affords the opportunity to revisit Beauvoir’s work 
on women’s situation and lived experience and to employ it as a critical lens through 
which to examine representations of women in American culture and film.  The concept 
of women’s immanence is central to Beauvoir’s analysis in The Second Sex. As Mann 
(2008) observes, living in a state of immanence means that women exist as relative 
beings, “materially and ontologically dependent” (138). Kaplan (1974) argues that, as a 
visual medium, people are especially vulnerable to film and the images it conveys, which 
makes it an important medium for constructing a cultural history of women ( Kaplan, 5). 
Using critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2001), I examine chapters detailing 
women’s lived experience in the revised version of The Second Sex. Beauvoir’s analyses 
may provide a critical lens that helps explain why representations of women that have 
endured for centuries continue to appeal to mainstream American audiences.  
Examining images of women in film and other media is important not only for 
constructing a cultural history but also because such images have “real” consequences for 
how women experience the world with regard to their bodies. Studies such as the Report 
of the APA Task Force on the Sexualization of Girls (2011), Hill and Fischer’s (2008) 
work on the objectification of women, and O’Donohue, Gold, and McKay’s (1997) work 
on magazine advertisements confirm that images of girls and women in visual media 
have a tremendous impact on how girls and women view themselves, particularly with 
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regard to sexual objectification.  Sexual objectification can translate into negative 
psychological consequences for women such as depression, anxiety, disordered eating, 
and body shame (Hill & Fischer, 746). Explaining how objectification is internalized and 
in turn negatively affects women, Hill and Fischer write, “In other words, women come 
to value their bodies in observable, appearance-based terms (e.g., ‘How do I look?’) 
rather than in non-observable, competence-based terms (e.g., ‘How do I feel?’ or ‘What 
am I physically capable of?’)” (747).  
Beauvoir demonstrates how women are prevented from valuing not only their bodies 
but the whole of their existence in empowering, competence-based terms by their 
construction as immanent and inessential. Beauvoir’s analyses in The Second Sex (2009) 
detail the impact these representations may have on how women think of themselves and 
on their actual lived experiences. The detailed descriptions in The Second Sex of 
women’s situations and characters in both lived experience and in images and 
representations of women constructed in art and literature make it an ideal lens for 
conducting a feminist analysis of film. Inclusion of the previously omitted descriptions of 
women’s lived experience in the new translation of The Second Sex provides an even 
more solid link between art and “real life. 
 
Literature Review 
 
This research draws on Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, translated by 
Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, as its primary text. Secondary 
literature draws from areas such as feminist film theory, feminist philosophy, and critical 
theory. Though the “Myths” section of The Second Sex has been widely used for a 
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number of critical analyses (Bair, 1986; Fichera, 1986; Holter, 1971; Klaw, 1998), only a 
few apply it to film, such as Haymes’ (1974) article “Movies in the 1950’s: Sexism from 
A to Zapata.” Haymes (1974) analyzes the five prototypes depicting Western man’s view 
of women Beauvoir identifies in The Second Sex and applies them to films with titles 
corresponding to each letter of the alphabet.  
Though Beauvoir’s analysis of the five prototypes of women focuses on the treatment 
of women in the genre of the novel, Haymes demonstrates how each one can be directly 
applied to representations of women in film, though Beauvoir herself is not concerned 
with that particular medium. Over half of the films Haymes cites are Academy Award 
winners or “Top Ten” New York Times selections, and the rest are “reasonably known to 
even casual observers of films” (Haymes, 12). Beauvoir’s first prototype is of “woman as 
flesh,” and she cites the works of D.H. Lawrence to illustrate how women are represented 
as such. Haymes lists several movies where woman is not only represented as flesh, but 
as previously mentioned, she is also subjected to brutal consequences because of her 
sexuality.  
Anatomy of a Murder, The Goddess, A Streetcar Named Desire, and Diabolique are 
but a few of the films Haymes analyzes that not only depict woman as flesh, but feature 
her as the victim of rape, murder, and intimidation as well. Haymes also notes that, 
although D. H. Lawrence promised “salvation through submission to sexuality,” 
woman’s sexuality in film can bring death instead (Haymes, 12). Haymes applies 
Beauvoir’s remaining four prototypes, woman as “Magna Mater,” woman as guide to the 
divine existence, woman as a guide to truth, beauty, and poetry, and woman-as-equal 
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(only so that man might measure himself, as Beauvoir claims) to a number of other films 
spanning the decades between the 1950s and the 1970s. 
 
Feminist Film Theory 
According to Kaplan (1974), the psychoanalytic perspective states that what we 
perceive visually impacts the whole of human experience (Kaplan, 5). Since its inception 
in the 1970s, feminist film theory has used psychoanalysis to account for the fascination 
with and impact of film (Smelik, 180). Mulvey’s (1975) foundational essay “Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” is one of the most widely cited and debated feminist 
analyses of film to date. It demonstrates the relationship between psychoanalytic concepts 
such as scopophilia and visual media, and establishes the terminology of the all-pervasive 
“male gaze” (Mulvey, 7-11).  
Discussing the departure from early feminist criticism that analyzed stereotypical 
roles of women in film and the advent of structuralist theoretical approaches such as 
semiotics and psychoanalysis, Smelik (1999) writes, 
The important theoretical shift here is from an understanding of cinema as reflecting 
reality, to a view of cinema as constructing a particular, ideological, view of reality. 
Classical cinema never shows its means of production and is hence characterized by 
veiling over its ideological construction. Thus, classical film narrative can present the 
constructed images of 'woman' as natural, realistic and attractive. This is the 
illusionism of classical cinema. (Smelik, 353) 
 
In addition to concepts such as Mulvey’s (1975) “male gaze,” the feminist psychoanalytic 
perspective also seeks to account for the widespread fascination with and attraction to 
film by use of Freud’s idea of scopophilia, which is the desire to see (Smelik 1999: 355).  
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As Smelik (1999) notes, scholars such as Koch (1980) argue that a “female gaze” 
exists and allows female spectators to enjoy movies from perspectives that are not 
masculine:  
Gertrud Koch (1980) is one of the few feminists who early on recognized that women 
could also enjoy the image of female beauty on the screen. Especially the vamp, an 
image exported from Europe and integrated into Hollywood cinema, provides the 
female spectator with a positive image of autonomous femininity. Koch argues that 
the image of the vamp revives for the female spectator the pleasurable experience of 
the mother as the love object in early childhood. Moreover, the sexual ambivalence of 
the vamp, of for example Greta Garbo and Marlene Dietrich, allows for a female 
homo-erotic pleasure which is not exclusively negotiated through the eyes of men. 
(Smelik, 358) 
 
Though Koch (1980) argues for a female gaze from a “positive position of autonomous 
feminity” (Smelik, 358), she employs psychoanalytic concepts such as the mother as a 
“love object” as demonstrated in the above quote.  
In her examination of psychoanalysis in The Second Sex, Beauvoir finds value in 
Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage in childhood development:  
It would seem that from the time he recognizes his reflection in a mirror—a time that 
convinced with weaning—he begins to affirm his identity: his self merges with this 
reflection in such a way that it is formed only alienating itself. Whether the mirror as 
such plays a more or less considerable role, what is sure is that the child at about six 
months of age begins to understand his parents’ miming and to grasp himself under 
their gaze as an object. He is already an autonomous subject transcending himself 
toward the world: but it is only in an alienated form that he will encounter himself. 
(Beauvoir, 284)  
 
However, she rejects much of Freud’s work that comprises the foundation of 
psychoanalytic theory and criticizes several of his concepts such as the Electra and 
castration complexes:  
The father’s sovereignty is a fact of social order: Freud fails to account for this; he 
himself admits that it is impossible to know what authority decided at what 
moment in history that the father would prevail over the mother: according to 
him, this decision represents progress, but its causes are unknown. (Beauvoir, 53) 
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Therefore, her method of examining representations of women in The Second Sex often 
provides both an alternative to and a critique of the psychoanalytic perspective that 
dominates feminist film studies.   
Kaplan (1974) argues that by examining representations of women in surrealist and 
impressionist films and other filmic styles having little or no correspondence to reality, 
male myths and fantasies of women become especially clear (Kaplan, 6). Kaplan argues 
that although such myths and fantasies are prevalent in Hollywood genre films, they are 
shrouded in a “surface realism,” making them harder to decipher (Kaplan, 6).  Kaplan’s 
approach to films from New Wave directors of the 1960s is especially compatible with 
Beauvoir’s theoretical framework in The Second Sex. Describing the history of New 
Wave cinema, Monaco (1981) writes,  
The growth of the New Wave in France in the early sixties signaled the beginning of 
the seventh period of film history, 1960-1980. Technological innovations, a new  
approach to the economics of film production, and a new sense of the  political and  
social value of film have combined to form numerous ‘new wavelets’ in Eastern  
Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and eventually even the United States and  
Western Europe. (Monaco, 197) 
  
According to Kaplan (1974), such films feature questions about the meaning of existence, 
the impossibility of life, the impossibility of essence, and perhaps most importantly, the 
existential dilemma as paramount for all people regardless of sex (Kaplan, 19). Kaplan 
notes that in such films, existential crisis is often better represented through a central 
female character “because women are less shielded by job structures from facing the 
meaninglessness of their existence” (Kaplan, 19). Contrary to Kaplan’s idea that male 
myths and fantasies flourish in films with little correspondence to reality, Mulvey (2004) 
argues that in feminist surrealist and impressionist films produced by women, women are 
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more likely to be represented as they see themselves rather than how they are perceived 
through the male gaze (Mulvey, 1287). 
 
Feminist Philosophy and Theory 
The concept of women’s immanence is central to Beauvoir’s analysis in The Second 
Sex. As Mann (2008) observes, living in a state of immanence means that women exist as 
relative beings, “materially and ontologically dependent” (138). Beauvoir writes,  
In one sense, her whole existence is a waiting since she is enclosed in the limbo of  
immanence and contingency and her justification is always in someone else’s  hands:  
she is waiting for a tribute, men’s approval, she is waiting for love, she is waiting for  
gratitude and her husband’s or lover’s praise; she expects to gain from them her  
reasons to exist, her worth, and her very being. (649-650) 
 
In contrast to women’s immanence, men occupy the world of transcendence, though they 
“cross the threshold into the domain of immanence daily” (Mann. 142). For Beauvoir, 
men occupy the world of transcendence as a “flight” (Mann, 142) from the world of 
immanence where they are reminded that, like women, they are embodied beings subject 
to the laws of nature rather than beings of pure consciousness or “mind.” 
Quoting Beauvoir, Mann (2008) argues that this is why, when men are forced to cross 
over into the world of immanence, they often do so poorly:  
Perhaps the primary loss suffered by men at the moment of this crossing is the   
loss of masculine logic. ‘A syllogism is no help in making a successful   
mayonnaise, nor in quieting a child in tears, masculine reasoning is quite   
inadequate to the reality with which [woman] deals’ (Mann, 142).  
 
In addition, dualism and the division between mind and body in Western philosophy also 
delineate the spheres of immanence and transcendence: “But since the coming of 
patriarchy, life in man’s eyes has taken on a dual aspect: it is consciousness, will, 
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transcendence, it is intellect; and it is matter, passivity, immanence, it is flesh” (Beauvoir, 
163).  
For Beauvoir, access to the world of transcendence is necessary for all individuals if 
they are to live what she considers an authentic life: 
Every subject posits itself as transcendence concretely, through projects it   
accomplishes its freedom only by perpetual surpassing toward other freedoms;   
there is no other justification for present existence than its expansion toward an   
indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there   
is degradation of existence into ‘in-itself,’ of freedom into facticity; this fall is a   
moral fault if the subjects consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it   
takes the form of frustration and oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil.   
(Beauvoir, 16) 
 
Likewise, refusal to acknowledge that one belongs to the world of immanence also results 
in an inauthentic life. As illustrated above, these concepts of immanence and 
transcendence are undeniably gendered for Beauvoir.  
The “projects” through which freedom is actualized and transcendence is achieved 
are the physical and intellectual pursuits women were barred from throughout a major 
portion of history. The works and projects that almost exclusively defined women’s lives 
when confined to the private sphere of the household were never the acts of “perpetual 
surpassing” Beauvoir mentions in the above quote, but were instead acts of perpetual 
repetition that give rise to the old adage, “A woman’s work is never done.”  
This degradation of freedom into facticity has consequences for the physical bodies of 
women as well. The constant surpassing of physical goals—conquering this mountain 
peak, winning that race, performing this feat of strength, mastering that sport—are all 
ways of accessing the kind of freedom that characterizes Beauvoir’s masculine world of 
transcendence. Barred from participating in this type of physical freedom, women 
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perpetually experience the body as object, and though women’s access to these activities 
is substantially greater in the present, experiencing the body as object is still a significant 
problem.  
Understanding the significance of Beauvoir’s use of “woman,” “the woman,” and 
“women” is also crucial for an accurate reading of The Second Sex. Borde and Malovany-
Chevallier explain the distinction in the following:  
One particularly complex and compelling issue was how to translate la femme. In   
Le deuxieme sexe [the original French edition] the term has at least two meanings:   
‘the woman’ and ‘woman.’ At times it can also mean ‘women,’ depending on the   
context. ‘Woman’ in English used alone without an article captures woman as an   
institution, a concept, femininity as determined and defined by society, culture,   
history. Thus in a French sentence such as Le probleme de la femme a toujours ete  
un probleme d’hommes, we have used ‘woman’ without an article: ‘The problem   
of woman has always been a problem of men.’ (Borde, Malovany-Chevallier,  xvii)  
 
When Beauvoir uses “woman” without an article, she does so to signify “woman as 
determined by society as just described” (Borde, Malovany-Chevallier, xvii). When 
Beauvoir uses “women,” she is referring to actual individual women and the material 
conditions that constitute their lived experience in the world. The same applies for 
Beauvoir’s use of the terms “man” and “men.”  
 Beauvoir’s exhaustive analysis of female biology in the first section of The Second 
Sex has prompted theorists such as Irigaray (1994) and Braidotti (2002) to use her work 
as a foundation for the “sexual difference” perspective of feminism. However, as Mann 
(2008) argues, Beauvoir’s project is actually to demonstrate how these categories of man 
and woman have been constructed and what it means to exist under each. In contrast to 
the sexual difference perspective of feminism, Butler (1990) argues that all gender is 
essentially a performance (Butler, 130), an especially significant claim when considering 
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the roles men and women play in film and debates over how they coincide or differ from 
the “real lives” of actors.  
Contrary to Butler’s (1990) theories of gender as a perpetual performance, Bordo 
(1997) argues that the study of representations and cultural discourse cannot stand in for a 
history of the body (Bordo, 91). Like Beauvoir, Bordo is a phenomenologist and argues 
that bodies must be discussed in all their “concrete and fleshly vulnerability” (Bordo, 91). 
Bordo (1997) argues that discussions of the body have been largely absent from 
philosophy because it has largely been dominated by men, who are drawn to philosophy 
as a “high, heady, and ‘untouchable’ realm where they can imagine themselves as 
masters rather than creatures of the universe” (Bordo, 92).  
Constructing an argument for materializing sex is not, however, the purpose for 
Bordo’s (1997) inclusion of the biological and evolutionary history of the body in her 
conception of materiality. She states that she invokes neither an “essential female 
subject” nor a “gender core,” and rejects the notion that feminism “must be grounded in 
the sexed specificity of the female body” (Bordo, 91), and in this respect, her arguments 
are in accord with Beauvoir’s. Bordo’s (1997) concern is instead for recognition of the 
material, concrete consequences of living life in a raced, gendered world (Bordo, 91). 
Bordo (1997) argues that keeping track of bodies and what is happening to them in lived 
experience is necessary for theorists to be intellectually honest (Bordo, 92). 
The difficulty with debates concerning the relationship between sexual difference and 
gender, Butler (2004) argues, is that it will never be possible to determine where the 
“biological, the psychic, the discursive, the social begin and end” (Butler, 185). The 
purpose of sexual difference debates is to pose the question of where the biological 
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relates to the cultural, though according to Butler (2004) it can never be answered, or 
more specifically, that the answer is always that sexual difference is partially constructed 
and partially given (Butler, 186).  
As a phenomenologist, Beauvoir insists that the characteristics women may have in 
common derive from their shared situation rather than a biological innate female essence 
or nature. Gothlin (2001) writes,  
The rather loose definition of Simone de Beauvoir as an existentialist is increasingly 
being superseded by a recognition that she belongs to the phenomenological tradition 
. . . If Beauvoir is characterized as a phenomenologist, the careful description of 
different aspects of women’s lives in Le deuxième sexe [The Second Sex] makes 
sense. (Gothlin, 43) 
 
Beauvoir’s focus on humans as “situated” and her concern with the meaning of 
phenomena such as anxiety and authenticity rather than just their descriptions mark her as 
a phenomenologist and set her apart from other phenomenologist philosophers such as 
Husserl (Gothlin, 44-45).  
Beauvoir painstakingly analyzes the myths and fantasies of feminine essence that 
compose the figure of woman throughout the whole of The Second Sex, but Volume II, 
titled “Lived Experience,” is especially useful when examining the roles women occupy 
in mainstream Hollywood film. I compare Beauvoir’s analysis of woman’s immanence to 
six mainstream Hollywood films to answer the following research questions: Are 
elements of Beauvoir’s description of women’s immanence visible in popular films made 
during the Hollywood Production Code (1930-1960) when Beauvoir was writing the 
text? Are the same elements present in more recent films not subject to the Hollywood 
Production Code? 
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Method 
I examine chapters detailing women’s lived experience in The Second Sex to 
determine whether they correspond to popular films of the decades both during and after 
the Hollywood Production Code.  I apply Beauvoir’s description of women in three 
chapters from the “Lived Experience” section of The Second Sex to six popular 
Hollywood films. I analyze one film made under the Hollywood Production Code and 
one contemporary post-code film for each of the three chapters I select. For “The 
Lesbian,” I analyze Morocco (1930) and High Art (1998). For “The Married Woman,” I 
analyze Adam’s Rib (1949) and The War of the Roses (1989). For “The Woman in Love,” 
I analyze The Philadelphia Story (1940) and Twilight (2008). These films were all 
nominated for or won a number of prestigious awards, confirming their popularity with 
audiences, the Academy, and a variety of independent organizations.  
Morocco received four Oscar nominations (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0021156/-
awards), and High Art won awards from the Los Angeles Film Critics Association, The 
Sundance Film Festival, the Independent Spirit Awards, GLAAD Media Awards, 
Fantasporto, and the Deauville Film Festival (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0139362/- 
awards). Adam’s Rib was nominated for an Oscar, a Golden Globe, a WGA, and won an 
award from the National Film Preservation Board (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0041090- 
/awards), and The War of the Roses was nominated for three Golden Globes 
(http://www.-imdb.com/title/ tt0098621 /awards). The Philadelphia Story won two 
Oscars (http:// ww-w.imdb.com/title/tt0032904/awards), and Twilight won two People’s 
Choice Awards and an impressive eleven Teen Choice Awards (http://www.imdb.com- 
/title/tt1099212-/awards).  
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In addition to their popularity with audiences, these six films all revolve around 
central female characters and their relationships with husbands, fiancés, boyfriends, and 
other women. As characters designed to appeal to mainstream audiences, an analysis of 
the female protagonists in these films should provide a crucial insight into what it means 
to declare that one is a woman and illustrate how that meaning has shifted, as well as how 
it has stayed the same, throughout the decades since Beauvoir first published The Second 
Sex.  
Though I analyze the other five films in their entirety, my analysis of Morocco (1930) 
consists of a single iconic scene. I discuss the character of Amy Jolly in the context of 
how she might be “read” as a lesbian in this scene, and the remainder of Morocco’s 
(1930) plot and characters consist of a heterosexual love story involving Amy Jolly and 
her two male suitors. Morocco (1930) also differs from the other films I analyze because 
it falls on the cusp of when the Hollywood Production Code was in effect, and because it 
was produced in Europe and therefore not subject to it. However, the film still had to 
conform with the elements of the Hollywood Production Code in order for it to be 
released to American audiences.  
Though Beauvoir employs many different critical lenses in her analysis of women’s 
situation in The Second Sex, her approach can be understood as a form of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). Woman as she appears in speech, myth, literature, and life 
must be viewed in terms of the language that posits her as the inessential other and strips 
her of the power to grasp transcendence. Fairclough’s (2001) description of semiosis 
explains how CDA can also be applied to images such as those in film: 
Critical discourse analysis asks: how does language figure as an element in social   
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processes? What is the relationship of language to other elements of social   
processes? (See Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 1992; 1995;   
Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 1996). Although most CDA focuses on  
language, some analysts also consider visual images (photographs, diagrams, etc.)   
or ‘body language’ (gestures, facial expressions, etc). I therefore refer to semiosis  
as well as language. Semiosis is meaning-making through language, body   
language, visual images, or any other way of signifying. (229) 
 
Fairclough (2001) argues that CDA does not actually begin with texts and interactions, 
but rather the issues and problems that preoccupy sociologists, educators, political 
scientists, and, as The Second Sex demonstrates, philosophers. The issues and problems 
that accompany the declaration that one is a woman is what compels Beauvoir to examine 
the various ways woman is signified and the circumstances that constitute her situation 
and lived experience. Beauvoir’s use of a variety of critical lenses in her analysis is also 
consistent with CDA, because as Fairclough (2001) argues, CDA is an inherently 
interdisciplinary approach (230).  
The term discourse is most often discussed in conjunction with the work of Michel 
Foucault, though the ways in which theorists employ it as a methodology vary 
significantly (Mills, 2004). In The History of Sexuality Volume I, Foucault describes the 
central questions that comprise his discursive analysis of sex:   
The central issue, then...is not to determine whether one says yes or no sex...but to   
account for the fact that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the  
positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt   
people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said.   
(Foucault, 11) 
 
The film industry is an institution that not only “speaks” but also prompts others to speak 
about it through advertising and censorship campaigns, as well as through more neutral 
discussions both public and private of the content it generates. A discursive analysis is 
especially useful for examining images of women in film because it takes into account 
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both the underlying structures of the film industry as an institution and the processes of 
meaning-making in which it engages. However, as previously mentioned, Beauvoir is an 
existentialist, and Foucault’s work is largely read as a rejection of the existentialist 
paradigm she espouses (Dosse, 1997).  Therefore, the ways in which CDA differs from 
Foucault’s discursive analyses are important to note, especially with regard to how CDA 
can function as a feminist critique.   
In her essay “Feminist Criticism in Motion,” Neely (1985) describes feminist 
criticism as a “creature of lack” (70). Neely argues that feminist criticism is not a 
methodology, but rather an ideology. Neely writes, “Feminist critics are feminists—but 
the ideology itself escapes definition and the relation between the ideology and the 
criticism is a loose and problematic one” (70). As Neely notes, feminist critics may be 
Marxist or psychoanalytic (70). They may also employ semiotics, the politics of sexual 
difference, or French materialism. Others may work within a post-colonial framework, 
while still others might conduct their analyses through the lens of eco-feminism. 
Combining two or more approaches is also common practice in feminist criticism. 
However, a significant amount of feminist criticism is grounded on certain principles 
such as the marginalization of women throughout history, cultural devaluing of attributes 
associated with or considered indicative of femininity, and constraints placed upon 
women in the form of patriarchy.  
Mills (2004) describes how discourse theory differs from the ideological approach of 
earlier feminist criticism such as Neely (1985) employs:  
Those feminists who see femininity as an ideology to which women are subjected  
tend to consider femininity as homogeneous, as affecting all women in the same   
way; ideology as a structure does not allow for relatively different effects to be   
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experienced by different groups of women, and it does not allow that there might   
be different ideological structures for different classes or sexual orientations. (78) 
 
Though Beauvoir’s work in The Second Sex resembles an ideological approach in several 
aspects, it also diverges in that she analyzes the ways in which women attempt to claim 
power for themselves within the confines of their situation, though such attempts are 
often counterproductive and doomed to failure.  
According to Beauvoir, women gain their worth in the realm of transcendence 
primarily through their relation to men in a way that resembles a religious commitment. 
But this dependence is dangerous and unstable, because it provokes what Mann (2008) 
describes as a state of ecstatic awe, the reverse side of which is resentment, as Beauvoir’s 
description of married women illustrates. Women are not a powerless monolithic group 
according to Beauvoir, though many common elements may be observed in the way they 
live, speak, and are spoken about. Instead, Mann argues that Beauvoir should be read as 
suggesting that the capacity to move between specific viewpoints is precisely what is 
necessary in order to answer the question of what it means to declare that one is a woman 
and to explain why women are so intractably in the position of the other (Mann, 143). 
The six films I analyze all “speak” about women’s characters and the roles they 
occupy in mainstream Hollywood film. The popularity of each film suggests that it 
represents ways of thinking about women that resonate with contemporary American 
audiences as well as audiences during the days of the Production Code when Beauvoir 
was writing The Second Sex, and directly after the first English translation was published. 
These six films are all romances, though they also contain elements of various other 
genres as well; The Philadelphia Story (1940) is from the classic period of the screwball 
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comedy, while The War of the Roses (1989) is a contemporary dark romantic comedy. 
Adam’s Rib (1949) and Morocco (1930) both contain aspects of romantic comedy, but 
drama is also a dominant thematic element. High Art (1998) and Twilight (2008) are both 
romances that contain elements of melodrama, though the former is meant to correspond 
to reality and is sometimes classified as an “art film,” while the latter belongs to the 
fantasy genre and has the broader appeal of a blockbuster film. Despite the stylistic 
differences of these six films and the periods in which they were produced and released, 
Beauvoir’s analysis of woman and women’s situation and character is applicable to each 
one, demonstrating the value of her critical method.  
CDA analyzes the relationships between semiosis and other elements of social 
practice, and how those relationships radically shift and change (Fairclough, 234). CDA 
also examines how semiosis figures in representations: “Representation is a process of 
social construction of practices, including reflexive self-construction—representations 
enter and shape social processes” (Fairclough, 235). Because film is a medium that 
consists of both discourse and representation, CDA is a particularly useful approach for 
analyzing it. Additionally, CDA examines the ways in which social actors recontextualize 
representations depending on their social positioning (Fairclough, 234-235).  Female 
audiences recontextualize films by relating their own experiences and identities to central 
female characters and engaging in of their own acts of interpreting and meaning-making. 
Discursive structures and pressures not only mold the ways in which female 
characters in films are represented, they also mold the ways their bodies appear. Beauvoir 
is a phenomenologist as well as an existentialist, and as such she is concerned with bodies 
as well as ideas. Mills (2004) cites Bartky’s (1988) analysis of anorexia to demonstrate 
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how a feminist discursive analysis functions when applied to women’s bodies: “The ideal 
body of femininity—and hence the feminine body subject—is constructed; in doing this 
[magazines] produce a ‘practiced and subjected’ body, that is, a body on which an 
inferior status has been inscribed” (Mills, 85). Films construct and inscribe the bodies of 
female subjects in the same way magazines and other media do.  
In my analyses, I approach each film as a text in its own right. Rather than analyzing 
formal filmic conventions or biographical details of the actors and their careers, I treat 
each film as an artifact containing the data that are the subjects of my analysis (Foss, 
2009). However, in some instances it may be necessary to refer to information found 
outside of the films themselves in order to develop a better understanding of the greater 
cultural significance of the data contained in them. The first step of CDA involves 
identifying the specific social problem to be addressed, which in my analysis is the way 
women are represented in film. These representations influence both the way women are 
perceived by audiences and the way they perceive themselves and prevent them from 
experiencing the world as transcendent beings.  
The second step of CDA involves a description of the context for the problem of 
representations of women in film and how the texts I analyze encapsulate it. As 
previously mentioned, film is considered especially influential because it is a visual 
medium, and the widespread appeal of the six films I analyze suggests that the images of 
women they contain are consumed by a wide variety of audiences.  These six films all 
describe the lives and characters of central female protagonists using conventions that are 
as recognizable to audiences of the 1930s-1960s as they are to audiences of 2008. The 
third step of CDA involves an analysis of why society continues to perpetuate 
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representations of women that impose limits on their ability to posit themselves as 
transcendent subjects. The remaining two step of CDA involve identifying any gaps or 
contradictions in the discourse on how women are represented in film and whether the 
yields any opportunities for emancipatory change. I address these final two steps in the 
Conclusion.  
 
The Hollywood Production Code 
The Hollywood Production Code, which governed the content of mainstream films in 
accordance with “moral standards,” was active during the time Beauvoir was writing The 
Second Sex, and for approximately a decade after its first publication. Though the 
Production Code was written in 1930, the film industry largely ignored it 
(http://www.und.edu/instruct/cjacobs/ProductionCode.htm). For this reason, movies 
produced between 1930 and 1934 are often referred to as “pre-code.” By 1934, increased 
public outcry over the content of films bolstered the authority of the Production Code 
Administration, and filmmakers were forced to comply with the Production Code in order 
to receive the Administration’s seal of approval for public exhibition (http://www.und.-
edu/instruct/cjacobs/ProductionCode.htm).  The importance placed on film and its ability 
to influence audiences is implicit in the reactionary language of the Production Code 
itself:  
III. The motion picture has special Moral obligations: Most arts appeal to the mature.  
This art appeals at once to every class, mature, immature, developed, undeveloped,  
law-abiding, criminal.  
A.  Music has its grades for different classes; so has literature and  
drama. This art of the motion picture, combining as it does the two fundamental  
appeals of looking at a picture and listening to a story, at once reaches every class of  
society. 
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B.  Because of the mobility of a film and the ease of picture distribution, and because  
of the possibility of duplicating positives in large quantities, this art reaches places  
unpenetrated by other forms of art. 
Because of these two facts, it is difficult to produce films intended for only certain  
classes of people. The exhibitor’s theatres are for the masses, for the cultivated and  
the rude, mature and immature, self-restrained and inflammatory, young and old, law- 
respecting and criminal. Films, unlike books and music, can with difficulty be  
confined to certain selected groups. 
(http://www.und.edu/instruct/cjacobs/ProductionCode.htm)  
 
According to the Production Code, the accessibility of film meant that filmmakers had a 
moral obligation to present content designed “to improve the race, or, at least, to recreate 
and rebuild human beings exhausted with the realities of life”(http://www.und.edu-
/instruct/cjacobs/ProductionCode.htm). The founding of the Motion Picture Association 
of America in1968 allowed filmmakers the freedom to include any content they desired 
by establishing the letter rating system. Unlike the Production Code, letter ratings were 
based on the content of films itself rather than its adherence to moral values (http:-
//www.und.edu/instruct/cjacobs/ProductionCode.htm).  
 Describing the role of the Catholic Church in the implementation of the Hollywood 
Production Code, Black (1989) writes,  
In less than a year the church had recruited millions of Americans of all religious 
denominations to pledge not to attend ‘immoral’ movies. With a national depression 
already threatening Hollywood's financial stability, movie czar Will Hays, head of the 
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of American (MPPDA), accepted the 
terms of surrender dictated by the church and its legions. (Black, 167) 
 
The agreement between Hays and Most Reverend John T. McNichols led to the creation 
of an agency that would enforce the censorship code previously ignored by the film 
industry. The Church’s demands echoed the concern with “immoral” behavior expressed 
in the language of the Production Code itself:  “The church demanded that Hollywood 
permanently withdraw from circulation films it viewed as ‘immoral’ and that local theater 
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owners be empowered to cancel any film currently in circulation if they judged it to be 
‘immoral.’” (Black, 167) 
Examining the ways women and their sexuality are represented in films made under 
the Production Code reveals not only what was left out, but also reflects the norms and 
concerns of the culture in general. Krzywinska (2006) notes that focusing solely on what 
was omitted under regulations such as the Production Code provides only a partial view 
of the cultural processes involved:  
Following Jacobs and Kuhn’s approach, I advocate that to simply focus on what is   
withheld from public view by regulation presents us with an incomplete picture.   
Instead, it is more useful to demonstrate how censorships and regulation work to   
produce narrative forms, conventions and vocabularies that have been used to   
represent and mediate sex, sexuality and desire. Institutional restrictions come out   
of a particular cultural context, and, as such, are often in some way reflective of   
that terrain, with all its various pressure points and faultlines. (85)  
 
As previously noted, Haymes (1974) observes that women in films made under the 
Production Code often suffer brutal treatment as a result of their sexuality.  
Krzywinska argues that “transgressive” characters such as openly sexual women must 
be punished in films made under the Production Code: “One interesting aspect of the film 
[Red Dust, (1932)] is the women’s proactive sexuality, something that is ring-fenced by 
punishment and moral reprehension in post-1934 Hollywood film” (91). A sexually 
transgressive woman could also be countered by the presence of another female character 
whose “sufficient good” could compensate for her “evils” (Krzywinska, 95).  
In addition to representations of women’s sexuality in each film, I also examine 
narrative and stylistic elements in terms of their adherence to or departure from the 
Production Code. For example, the resolution of all conflicts into a perfect happy ending 
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is a convention of films made under the Production Code and is still visible in recent 
films: 
Classical Hollywood cinema therefore tended to smooth problems into saccharine  
‘all is well with the world’ endings, often in the form of a marriage or remarriage   
typified by comedies such as The Philadelphia Story and His Girl Friday (1940).   
(Krzywinska, 96) 
 
Comparing and contrasting films made under the Production Code with more recent films 
illuminates the sometimes disturbing affect of movies that break from the conventional 
happy ending where each wrong is neatly righted. The War of the Roses is an example of 
such a film, and though it is certainly a comedy, its tragic (though comedic) ending earns 
it the label of “dark.” In contrast, though Adam’s Rib contains moments of tense drama as 
well as comedy, its happy ending and neatly resolved conflicts exemplify the conventions 
of films made under the Production Code.   
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CHAPTER II 
WOMEN IN LOVE: BELLA SWAN AND TRACY LORD 
Bella Swan 
When a woman loves, she must forget her own personality. This is a law of nature. A 
woman does not exist without a master. Without a master, she is a scattered bouquet. 
—Cécile Sauvage (Cited in Beauvoir, 683) 
 
The success of Stephenie Myer’s Twilight series has provoked much discussion of its 
appeal to both girls and women. Breaking Dawn, the fourth and final book in the series, 
sold 1.3 million copies within 24 hours of its release. According to the New York Times, 
the only series of both books and movies able to compete with the Twilight series in 
terms of popularity is J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter franchise 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/movies/20pattinson.html). However, in addition to 
the box office and book sale figures, one notable difference sets Twilight apart from 
Harry Potter: Twilight’s fan base is mostly female, whereas no such gender distinction 
marks Harry Potter fans (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/movies-
/20pattinson.html).  
Though the Harry Potter series is narrated in the third person, it is mostly told from 
the point of view of Harry Potter, the male main protagonist. The Twilight series, on the 
other hand, is narrated in the first person from the point of view of Bella Swan, the 
female main protagonist. In the Twilight movies, actor Robert Pattinson plays Edward 
Cullen, Bella’s vampire love interest. In the Harry Potter movies, actor Daniel Radcliffe 
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plays Harry Potter. Both Pattinson and Radcliffe have been labeled “heartthrobs” and are 
much adored by their female fans. What, then, accounts for Twilight’s almost exclusive 
appeal to girls and women? Is it Twilight’s first person female narrative? Is it that 
Twilight is a love story, whereas the various romances in the Harry Potter series are 
mostly secondary plot developments? 
In the blogosphere, “Poorly written” and “anti-feminist” are two oft-cited descriptions 
of the Twilight books. Breaking Dawn, the final book of the series released in 2008, drew 
a number of objections from readers who were disappointed with the outcome of the 
story, prompting one reader to begin a “Don’t burn it—return it” campaign on 
Amazon.com1. The Twilight series’ content has prompted criticism from the academic 
sphere as well. Merskin (2010) argues that according to the definition established by 
Guggenbühl-Craig, the vampire Edward Cullen is a compensated psychopath, “an 
individual who approaches the psychological extreme of psychopathy, but is able to pass 
for functional in society” (Merskin, 3). Additionally, Merskin compares Edward to earlier 
cinematic representations of vampires, noting that unlike his predecessors, many of 
which were monstrous beings who stank of decay and the grave, Edward is a handsome 
teenager from an affluent family (Merskin, 5-7).  
Merskin (2010) also argues that while depictions of vampires as monstrosities can be 
observed as recently as Francis Ford Coppola’s 1992 version of Bram Stoker’s Dracula, 
Anne Rice’s novel Interview with the Vampire (1977) marked a change in the way 
vampires are portrayed in popular culture (Merskin,7). Edward, with his aesthetic appeal, 
                                                     
1 http://www.amazon.com/Unhappy-Breaking-Dawn-burn-it-
RETURN/forum/Fx1GAA6GYWX8459/TxJ0PLIBGHDLU5/1/ref=cm_cd_ef_tft_tp?_encoding=UTF8&a
sin=031606792X 
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his skin that sparkles instead of singes in the sunlight, his “superior” ethical choice to 
consume the blood of animals rather than humans, and the immortality that affords him 
the possibility of perfecting wisdom and intellect, is the exemplar of the “new vampire.” 
And according to Beauvoir’s description of masculine transcendence, Edward Cullen 
personifies it. 
The depictions of gender and sexuality at work in the Twilight series represent the 
fundamental myths of men and women that have characterized the Western world for 
millennia. These representations account for the appeal the Twilight series holds for 
female fans and its overall success in bookstores and box offices despite criticisms of 
both its literary quality and content matter. The Twilight series tells the ancient story of 
woman’s immanent and man’s transcendent qualities, but its appeal is in the privilege 
granted to Bella Swan: the privilege to escape the world of female immanence and to 
permanently occupy the world of male transcendence, a privilege not possible for a “flesh 
and blood” woman.  
Beauvoir describes the division of life into immanence and transcendence and its 
gendering: 
Man sinks his roots in Nature; he was engendered, like animals and plants; he is  
well aware that he exists only inasmuch as he lives. But since the coming of   
patriarchy, life in man’s eyes has taken on a dual aspect: it is consciousness, will,   
transcendence, it is intellect; and it is matter, passivity, immanence, it is flesh. 
(Beauvoir, 163) 
 
In this dual aspect of life, man assigns himself the qualities of transcendence while 
assigning woman the aspects of immanence which include embodiment and flesh, and as 
such, the way women and men are characterized under patriarchy is constituted. Beauvoir 
argues that through menstruation, the cycle of birth and death is recreated again and again 
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in the body of woman (Beauvoir, 166). Though woman possesses the ability to give life 
through childbirth, Beauvoir notes that in most folk representations, “Death is woman, 
and women mourn the dead because death is their work” (Beauvoir, 166).  
As a member of the new generation of vampires, Edward Cullen leaves behind these 
feminine attributes of death and immanence that characterized his predecessors. He is a 
fantasy, but rather than a nightmare, he is a dream: the masculine dream of pure 
transcendence. But as Beauvoir notes in the quote above, man is aware that existence is 
contingent upon life, and life entails the immanent aspects of flesh, blood, and death. If 
he is to exist as anything other than a monster, Edward must recognize life in all its 
immanence. Edward needs a mediator between the world of immortal transcendence and 
the world of mortal human immanence, and her name is Bella Swan. 
For Beauvoir, the division of life into these dual aspects of transcendence and 
immanence means that when man seeks to “overcome his solitude with ecstasy” 
(Beauvoir, 171), he must call upon woman as his mediator between the forces of the earth 
and the cosmos:  
She still assures the fertility of the fields for the Bedouins and the Iroquois; in ancient  
Greece, she heard subterranean voices; she understood the language of the wind and  
the trees: she was Pythia, Sibyl, and prophetess. The dead and the gods spoke through  
her mouth. Still today, she has these powers of divination: she is medium, palmist,  
card reader, clairvoyant, inspired; she hears voices and has visions. (Beauvoir, 170- 
171) 
 
John Durham Peters’ (1999) discussion of the once exclusively female occupation of 
telephone switchboard operator demonstrates that, as Beauvoir states above, these 
representations of woman continue to permeate Western culture, adapting and changing 
as their modes of communication adapt and change:  
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Like spiritualist mediums, operators inhabit a profoundly liminal space. The female  
body hidden at the heart of a national communications network, appearing only in  
impersonal voice, is an archetypal figure. In popular culture the operator was often  
treated as a heroine who, knowing everyone’s habits, could bring people together in  
emergencies: the operator as matchmaker, lifeguard, or angel of mercy. She was  
always betwixt and between. (Peters, 196)   
 
Bella Swan’s situation bears the hallmarks of woman as “betwixt and between.” She is 
able to mediate the mysteries of the earth and human immanence for Edward, who is not 
constrained by the biological functions of human life.  
Bella chooses to separate herself from the warm Arizona sun and her “loving, erratic, 
harebrained mother and her new husband” to live with in Forks, Washington with her 
father, who she refers to by his first name in the voiceover. “The best thing about Charlie 
is that he doesn’t hover,” she remarks (Twilight, 2008). Though in geographical terms, 
Bella moves “up” to the north, the climate of her new location with its perpetually veiled 
sun and thick forests creates a liminal space somewhere between chthonic darkness and 
the clear light of day2.  In the mists and dim light of the forest, Bella tells Edward she 
knows he is a vampire, prompting him to acknowledge both his true “nature” as a killer 
and his love for her: “I wanted to kill you. I've never wanted a human's blood so much in 
my life,” he tells her, and only moments later he adds, “You don’t know how long I’ve 
waited for you. And so the lion fell in love with the lamb” (Twilight, 2008). Bella is both 
the prey and property of Edward which, according to Beauvoir, is the fate of woman 
when she steps into her predestined role of “wife” (Beauvoir, 171).  
The qualities Bella possesses make her especially suited for Edward’s attentions, 
because according to Beauvoir, not just any woman can play the role of mediator:  
                                                     
2 See Beauvoir’s discussion of the subsistence of the chthonian cults of women and the sun cults of men 
throughout Greek and Roman rationalist civilizations (Beauvoir, 171).  
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She must embody the wondrous blossoming of life while concealing its mysterious  
disturbances at the same time...The ideal of feminine beauty is variable; but some  
requirements remain constant; one of them is that since woman is destined to be  
possessed, her body has to provide the inert and passive qualities of an object.  
(Beauvoir, 176) 
 
Meyer’s explanations of the way Bella is described in the Twilight books seem to have 
much in common with Beauvoir’s statement that ideals of feminine beauty are variable. 
In response to the frequently asked question “What does Bella look like,” Meyer does 
offer a description of how she herself imagines her, but she prefaces it with the following:  
I left out a detailed description of Bella in the book so that the reader could more   
easily step into her shoes. However, so many people have asked this question, I   
have decided to tell you what she looks like to me. But I want to stress, Bella's   
looks are open to interpretation. (http://www.stephenie-meyercom-/twilight_faq.-
html#pretty).  
 
Bella’s beauty may be “variable” or “open to interpretation,” but the details Meyer does 
provide make it clear that she possesses more than enough “inert and passive qualities” to 
render her an object, so much so that Merskin (2010) describes her as follows: “The girl’s 
only apparent talents are cooking and ironing. Otherwise she is uncoordinated, frequently 
falls down, often gets lost, is socially awkward, and needs regular rescuing” (158).   
 In a frequently quoted scene mere hours after discovering Edward is a vampire, Bella 
makes the following observation:  
 About three things I was absolutely positive: First, Edward was a vampire; 
 Second, there was part of him — and I didn’t know how potent that part might be  — 
 that thirsted for my blood; And third, I was unconditionally and irrevocably in 
 love with him. (Twilight, 2008) 
 
Though Edward is a predator who thirsts for her blood, it is not from him that Bella needs 
rescuing. The night before Bella tells Edward she knows he is a vampire, he rescues her 
from a group of men who corner her on a dark street and attempt to assault her. As the 
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couple speed away in Edward’s BMW, he begs Bella to distract him so he does not turn 
the car around to pursue her would-be attackers and “rip their heads off.” “You don’t 
know the vile, repulsive things they were thinking,” he tells her (Twilight, 2008).  
Later, as the two sit in a restaurant, Edward confesses that he can indeed read 
minds—every mind but hers: “I can read every mind in this room apart from yours . . 
.That’s very frustrating,” he tells her (Twilight, 2008). As previously noted in the section 
on feminine immanence and masculine transcendence, the immanent world is 
unintelligible to the masculine mind of pure logic and intellect. As the perfect 
embodiment of feminine immanence, Bella is worthy of receiving the reward that 
Edward eventually bestows upon her: permanent access to his world of immortality and 
transcendence.  
 Bella’s all-consuming love for Edward despite the mortal threat he poses to her 
exemplifies Beauvoir’s description of the woman in love:  
 She would like to devote to him each beat of her heart, each drop of blood, the 
 marrow of her bones; this is what a dream of martyrdom expresses; to exaggerate the 
 gift of self to the point of torture, of death, to be the ground the beloved treads on, to 
 be nothing but that which responds to his call. (Beauvoir, 692)  
 
Because Edward is a vampire, Bella can literally devote to him each drop of her blood, 
each beat of her heart, and the marrow from her bones. The characteristics that would 
otherwise mark Edward as a monster are instead the means through which the impossible 
dream of the woman in love is actualized. These same characteristics allow him to 
permanently reside in the realm of transcendence which ordinary men must abandon at 
least occasionally. Edward does not need to visit the realm of immanence even to sleep, 
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and is therefore not subject to the hostility with which Beauvoir claims the woman in 
love regards her slumbering lover:  
 But the god, the master, must not abandon himself to the repose of immanence; it is 
 with a hostile look that the woman contemplates this destroyed transcendence; she 
 detests his animal inertia, this body that no longer exists for her but in itself, 
 abandoned to a contingence whose ransom is her own contingence. (Beauvoir, 697) 
 
The same is not true for the man who regards the sleeping woman who loves him. 
Edward appears in Bella’s room one night and informs her that he comes in secret to 
occasionally watch her sleep. “I like watching you sleep,” he tells her. “It’s kind of 
fascinating to me” (Twilight, 2008). Sleep gives woman back the “disarming candor of 
her childhood” and grants certitude to the man who regards her that she belongs to no 
one, according to Beauvoir (Beauvoir, 696-697).  
 As the epigraph by Cécile Sauvage suggests, Bella forgets her own personality in her 
devotion to Edward. At first she detests the climate of Forks and longs for the heat of 
Arizona, remarking that she hates cold, wet things. But Bella forgets her hatred of cold 
things in her all-consuming passion for Edward: “Your skin is pale white and ice cold,” 
she remarks, yet he does not frighten or repulse her. “I’m not afraid of you. I’m only 
afraid of losing you,” she tells him (Twilight, 2008). As a vampire, Edward can also 
guarantee Bella safety from the disappointments that befall Beauvoir’s woman in love: 
  Idolatrous love confers an absolute value on the loved one...It is a heartrending 
 disappointment for the woman to discover her idol’s weaknesses and mediocrity...this 
 disillusion is often crueler than the child’s at seeing paternal prestige crumble,  
 because the woman herself chose the one to whom she made a gift of her whole 
 being. (Beauvoir, 694) 
 
Edward is free from the mediocrity and weakness that marks a mortal man. In fact, his 
only weakness is Bella herself: “We’ve learned to control our thirst. But you, your 
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scent—it’s like a drug to me. You’re like my own personal brand of heroin,” he tells her 
(Twilight, 2008).  Bella’s reward for embodying female immanence is a lover who will 
never disappoint her, a perfect specimen of masculine transcendence.  
 As a vampire, not only is Edward himself free from mortality, but so is his and 
Bella’s love for each other:  
 If two lovers disappear into the absolute of passion together, all freedom deteriorates 
 into immanence; only death can provide a solution; this is one of the meanings of the 
 Tristan and Isolde myth. Two lovers who are exclusively destined for each other are 
 already dead: they die of boredom. (Beauvoir, 698)  
 
Though Bella and Edward are exclusively destined for each other, their fate will never be 
death or boredom. Rather than deteriorating into immanence, they can both occupy the 
world of transcendence and immortality if Edward makes Bella into a vampire as well, 
and Bella is determined to convince him to do so.  
The film’s climax occurs when Bella is once again in need of rescuing, this time from 
James, a rival vampire who wishes to claim her as his victim. He lures her into a trap by 
tricking her into believing her mother is in danger, and Edward must battle him to the 
death. James bites Bella, forcing Edward to choose between ridding her of the venom that 
would change her into a vampire, or allowing the change to occur and Bella to become as 
he is. He chooses the former, much to Bella’s disappointment. When she asks him why, 
he replies, “So that’s what you dream about? Becoming a monster?” Bella replies that she 
dreams about being with him forever, prompting him to ask “Is it not enough just to have 
a long and happy life with me?” (Twilight, 2008) But for Bella it is not enough. “No one 
will surrender tonight, but I won’t give in. I know what I want,” Bella says in the closing 
voiceover (Twilight, 2008). For many women, “happily ever after” is achieved by 
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marrying the perfect man and bearing his children, but “perfectly ever after” can only 
occur when she occupies his world of transcendence as his equal. This is the privilege 
Edward eventually grants to Bella Swan, and it is only possible in the world of fiction.  
 
Tracy Lord 
The opening scene of The Philadelphia Story (1940) features Tracy Lord (Katharine 
Hepburn) throwing her husband C.K. Dexter Haven (Cary Grant) out of their beautiful 
mansion. She appears with his bag of golf clubs and breaks one over her knee, prompting 
Dexter to raise his fist as if to strike her, but he settles for pushing her down to the ground 
instead. Though no dialogue occurs in this scene, it is clear to the audience that Tracy and 
Dexter are spirited, animated, and wealthy, and their anger borders on the playful. Tracy, 
a wealthy society beauty, is almost the polar opposite of Bella Swan. She has grace, style, 
poise, has been married and divorced, and is now engaged to marry again. Beauvoir notes 
that passionate love “often blooms outside of marriage” (Beauvoir, 701), and for Tracy 
Lord and Dexter Haven, this is certainly the case.  
According to Beauvoir, a woman in Tracy’s position is more readily able to 
devote her life to love:  
Almost all women have dreamed of the ‘great love’: they have had imitations, they 
 have come close to it; is has come to them in incomplete, bruised, trifling, imperfect, 
 and false forms; but very few have really dedicated their existence to it. The great 
 women lovers are often those who did not waste their emotions on juvenile crushes; 
 they first accepted the traditional feminine destiny: husband, home, children; or they 
 lived in difficult solitude; or they counted on some venture that more or less failed 
 (Beauvoir, 685). 
 
Tracy and Dexter “married on impulse, divorced in a rage,” according to Sidney Kidd 
(Henry Daniell), the publisher of Spy magazine. “Neither of us has been much of a 
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success at being a wife,” says Tracy’s mother, who is also divorced from Tracy’s 
philandering father. “We just picked the wrong first husbands,” Tracy assures her (The 
Philadelphia Story, 1940).  
 The Philadelphia Story is a comedy of remarriage, a genre that thrived under the 
Production Code which prohibited films depicting adulterous relationships (Cavell, 
1981). Because they are divorced, characters in comedies of remarriage can engage in 
behavior that otherwise would subject them to moral judgment. Gilmour (1998) argues 
that comedies of remarriage feature a couple who have become disenchanted with each 
other and the realities of marriage, and ultimately become re-enchanted with each other 
when these problems are resolved (29). Though women’s roles in comedies of remarriage 
are often contradictory, they all share one thing in common: “Women in the comedies of 
remarriage are not uniformly aggressive, however. Since they are never shown to have 
close friends, overriding interests, or careers, their romances are literally their lives” 
(Gilmour, 36).  
Tracy Lord is no exception to this rule. Her position in society and her considerable 
wealth assure that she lives a life of leisure. Her pursuits consist of traveling to exotic 
destinations, decadent parties, swimming in the pool of the family estate, and courting her 
new fiancé, George Kittredge (John Howard). Charmed though her life may be, however, 
it is evident from the beginning of the film that Tracy has problems with not only her ex 
husband, but also her estranged father who she does not want in attendance at her 
wedding.  
 George Kittredge first appears in the film when he meets Tracy at the stables for an 
afternoon ride. Both are dressed in riding clothes, but Tracy declares that he looks awful, 
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“like something out of a shop window,” then playfully tackles him to the ground and rubs 
dirt on his breeches. George protests, remarking that his clothes are new. “I don’t get it! 
When I was a coal miner, I wanted enough money to buy clean clothes. Now that I’m a 
general manager—” he quips (The Philadelphia Story, 1940). Like his clothes, George’s 
money is new. He is a self-made man from humble beginnings, whereas Tracy’s ex 
husband Dexter comes from old money just as she herself does. “Perhaps it offends my 
vanity to have anyone who is even remotely my wife re-marry so obviously beneath her,” 
Dexter tells Tracy (The Philadelphia Story, 1940).  
The issue of class is highly significant for Beauvoir’s woman in love:  
Of course, the man must belong to the same class and the same race as her own: the 
privilege of sex works only within this framework; for him to be a demigod, he must 
obviously be a human being first, for the daughter of a colonial officer, the native is 
not a man; if the young girl givers herself to an ‘inferior,’ she is trying to degrade 
herself because she does not think she is worthy of love. (Beauvoir, 684) 
 
George’s money and success partially legitimize his relationship with Tracy, but it is 
clear that he lacks her carefree whimsical attitude. It is also clear that George is not at 
home on horseback, and appears even more awkward compared with Tracy and her 
sister’s expert horsemanship. George and Tracy’s incompatibility is not limited to the 
superficial, however. Tracy tells him that what she really wants is to be useful in life, but 
George’s wish is to build her an ivory tower “with my own two hands” (The Philadelphia 
Story, 1940). “I don’t want to be worshipped,” she tells him. “I want to be loved. I mean 
really loved” (The Philadelphia Story, 1940). George is simply not a “good fit” for Tracy, 
a phrase repeated by various characters throughout the entire film.  
In contrast, Dexter’s incompatibility with Tracy stems from his alcoholism rather than 
his inability to understand her on intellectual and emotional level. Though Dexter’s 
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drinking is the reason Tracy upholds for their failed marriage, it becomes apparent that 
Dexter believes a portion of the blame is hers. In a confrontation with her while she is 
preparing for a swim with Macaulay Connor (Jimmy Stewart), Dexter states, “When I 
gradually discovered that my relationship to her was supposed to be not that of a loving 
husband and good companion...but that of a kind of high priest to a virgin goddess, my 
drinks grew deeper and more frequent,” Dexter claims (The Philadelphia Story, 1940). 
Dexter also makes it apparent that Tracy was aware of his drinking before they 
married. “You took on that problem with me when you took me,” he tells her. Tracy’s 
intolerance for what she perceives as weakness in others, particularly the men in her life, 
is one of the central themes of the film:”Because you’ll never be a first class human being 
or a first class woman until you’ve learned to have some regard for human frailty,” is 
Dexter’s parting shot to her in their confrontation by the pool. The theme of Tracy’s 
intolerance is repeated in the very next scene, this time during a confrontation with her 
father about his philandering: “You have everything it takes to make a lovely woman 
except the one essential: an understanding heart. And without that, you might just as well 
be made of bronze,” her father tells her (The Philadelphia Story, 1940).   
Just as Dexter suggests that Tracy is partially responsible for his drinking, Tracy’s 
father suggests that she is somehow partially at fault for his infidelity due to her lack of 
an “understanding heart.” Beauvoir’s woman in love is also torn asunder by the discovery 
of imperfection in the men to whom she devotes herself:  
It is a heartrending disappointment for the woman to discover her idol’s weaknesses 
and mediocrity...this disillusion is even crueler than the child’s at seeing paternal 
prestige crumble, because the woman herself chose the one to whom she made a gift 
of her whole being. (Beauvoir, 694) 
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No flesh-and-blood man can live up to the godlike ideals of the woman in love: “Hence 
the disillusioned sayings: ‘You shouldn’t believe in Prince Charming. Men are just poor 
things.’ They would not seem like dwarfs if they were not required to be giants” 
(Beauvoir 695). Tracy is not only disillusioned with the realities of marriage, but also the 
human frailty of men in general. Her father’s philandering is the catalyst for the entire 
plot and the reason for Dexter’s reappearance in her life, as well as the presence of 
journalists Macaulay Connor and Liz Imbrie (Ruth Hussey), who are covering the story 
of her wedding. Yet, Tracy’s contempt for the weakness of the men in her life somehow 
presents a more pressing problem than Dexter’s alcoholism or her father’s infidelity.  
 Tracy is constantly referred to as a “goddess” throughout the entire film, sometimes 
as a reproach, and sometimes as a compliment. When Dexter first arrives unexpectedly to 
the Lords’ estate, she greets him hostilely. “I used to be afraid of that look. The withering 
glance of the goddess,” he tells her (The Philadelphia Story, 1940). When her father also 
arrives unexpectedly, she greets him with the same contempt. “Still justice with her 
shining sword, eh daughter? Who’s on the spot?” he asks. “We are, thanks to you!” she 
replies (The Philadelphia Story, 1940).  
To George, Tracy is a goddess because of her grace and beauty. To the men in her life 
who know her better, she is a goddess because of her harsh and detached judgment of 
them. The woman in love metes out the same cruel judgment:   
When he is no longer worshipped, he has to be trampled on. In the same of this halo 
with which the woman in love adorns her beloved, she forbids him all weakness; she 
is disappointed and irritated if he does not conform to this image she put in his place; 
if he makes a mistake, if he contradicts himself, she decrees he is ‘not himself,’ and 
she reproaches him for this. (Beauvoir, 695) 
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For Tracy, resolving her disillusionment with marriage means not only accepting that the 
men in her lives are not gods, but that she herself also possesses the same human frailty 
she despises in them. Tracy must recognize the she herself is also not a goddess. The 
same is not true for the vast majority of Beauvoir’s women in love, whose primary 
problem is the worship of men as gods, but Tracy’s situation is certainly not like that of 
most other women.  
First and foremost, Tracy’s wealth grants her permanent financial independence from 
any lover she chooses, as well as the freedom to engage in any pursuit and pastime she 
wishes. Cavell (1981) argues that the vast wealth of characters in comedies of remarriage 
provided an outlet of escape for audiences living through the Depression era. Citing 
Cavell, Gilmour (1998) writes, “Cavell points out the narrative convenience of 
establishing freedom from financial care. With no worries about money, and no need to 
waste time working, the pair has nothing to do but spend time with each other” (30). 
Though Tracy’s wealth and life of leisure allow her the ability to devote all her time 
to her lover, they also allow her to remain her “own person,” and George echoes this 
sentiment when she asks him if it bothers him that another man was once her “lord and 
master”: “I don't believe he ever was, Tracy, not really. I don't believe that anyone ever 
was or ever will be...You’re so much your own,” he replies (The Philadelphia Story, 
1940). The freedom Tracy’s considerable wealth and status grant her sets her apart from 
Beauvoir’s woman in love by providing her an escape from a life of blind devotion:  
Many women who bloomed at the beginning of a love affair that reinforced their 
narcissism become frightening in their maniacal servility when they feel less loved; 
obsessed and diminished, they irritate their lover; giving herself blindly to him, the 
woman loses that dimension of freedom that made her fascinating at first. (Beauvoir, 
704) 
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Though Tracy may be guilty of narcissism (“You’re far and away your favorite person in 
the world,” Dexter tells her), it would be difficult to imagine her willingly sacrificing the 
freedom she has always enjoyed as a result of her privileged status. Tracy has the means 
to remain fascinating to the men who pursue her even after she is “caught.”  
 The privilege Tracy enjoys means that she is already closer to the kind of equal love 
Beauvoir argues is only possible when women and men’s situation become the same: 
But Gusdorf is wrong to write ‘and in the same way man represents for the woman an 
indispensible intermediary of herself to herself,’ because today her situation is not the 
same...It would only be the same for woman if she also existed essentially for-herself; 
this would imply that she possessed an economic independence, that she projected 
herself toward her own ends and surpassed herself without intermediary toward the 
group. (Beauvoir, 707) 
 
 Tracy’s privilege allows her to exist as a woman “for-herself.” She is economically 
independent and can project herself toward any end she chooses. According to Beauvoir, 
failed love can only be productive if the woman is capable of “taking herself in hand 
again,” and Tracy is clearly capable of doing so as her refusal to remain married to 
Dexter and her engagement to George a year later illustrate. All that stands in the way of 
Tracy experiencing an equal love is her belief that she herself is above the weakness and 
human frailty she despises of the men in her life, which she is finally forced to 
acknowledge is untrue after her drunken escapade with Macaulay Connor.  
According to Dexter, Tracy conveniently blocks out any recollection of her own 
intemperance: “Oh, the night you got drunk on champagne and climbed out on the roof 
and stood there, naked, with your arms outstretched to the moon, wailing like a banshee,” 
he accuses amid her protests that she remembers doing no such thing (The Philadelphia 
Story, 1940). Once again, Tracy becomes uncharacteristically drunk at her Uncle Willie’s 
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party, this time ending up in the arms of Macaulay Connor to George’s shock and 
disapproval and Dexter’s amusement. Dexter sympathetically attempts to conceal Tracy’s 
discarded engagement ring from George’s sight and advises him to go to bed, but George 
refuses and is confronted with the sight of Macaulay carrying the drunken Tracy from the 
pool to the house.  
The next morning, it is George’s intolerance of Tracy’s behavior that forces her to 
confront her own as she reads a note from him explaining that her conduct was shocking 
to his “ideals of womanhood” and a “breach of common decency,” and that his attitude 
towards her has “changed materially” (The Philadelphia Story, 1940). It is then that 
Tracy realizes she has wronged Dexter in her refusal to accept his human frailty, thus 
enabling the two of them to engage in a truly equal union, and they do exactly that in the 
film’s conclusion. Thus, Tracy Lord escapes the fate of Beauvoir’s woman in love and 
remarries Dexter, this time with neither of them elevated to a godlike status and therefore 
destined to failure.  
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CHAPTER III 
MARRIED WOMEN: BARBARA ROSE AND AMANDA BONNER 
Barbara Rose 
“Wedding is destiny, and hanging likewise.”—Proverb (John Heywood) 
 According to the National Center for Health Statistics, compared with non-married 
individuals, married individuals enjoy a number of consistently documented benefits such 
as better mental and physical health, longer lives, and better health insurance coverage 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf). The same source confirms 
that these benefits also extend to the children of married couples. However, the institution 
of marriage in the US has undergone several notable changes during the 20th century such 
that Cherlin (2004) argues a “deinstitutionalization” is taking place, which he defines as 
“the weakening of social norms that define people’s behavior in a social institution such 
as marriage” (Cherlin, 848).  
According to Cherlin (2004), two major shifts in the meaning of marriage created the 
social context for deinstitutionalization: 
The first transition, noted by Ernest Burgess, was from the institutional marriage to 
the companionate marriage. The second transition was to the individualized marriage 
in which the emphasis on personal choice and self-development expanded. Although 
the practical importance of marriage has declined, its symbolic significance has 
remained high and may even have increased. It has become a marker of prestige and 
personal achievement. (Cherlin, 848) 
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The breakdown of norms governing marriage could lead to increased tensions between 
individuals who choose to enter it, but could also lead to a more egalitarian form of 
marriage between men and women (Cherlin, 848). Cherlin (2004) also cites the 
emergence of same-sex marriage and an increase in cohabitation as markers of the 
changing face of marriage, and a 2010 Pew publication reports that although marriage is 
declining for all groups, it is still the norm for college-educated adults in stable income 
brackets (http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-new-families).  
 The face of marriage has clearly changed since Beauvoir wrote The Second Sex, and 
in the years since The War of the Roses was released in 1989 as well. Regardless, 
Beauvoir’s analysis still rings true for many women:  
The destiny that society traditionally offers women is marriage. Even today, most 
women are, were, or plan to be married, or they suffer from not being so. Marriage is 
the reference by which the single woman is defined, whether she is frustrated by, 
disgusted at, or even indifferent to the institution. (Beauvoir, 439) 
 
Marriage is still the subject of films from a number of genres from romantic comedies to 
tragic melodramas, and of reality television programs such as WE’s Bridezilla and TLC’s 
Four Weddings and Say Yes to the Dress. Popular women’s magazines such as 
Cosmopolitan and Glamour still regularly feature strategies for “catching” and “keeping” 
a man. However, according to the 2006 “Monitoring the Future” survey, 41% of teenage 
boys agreed with the statement “Most people will have fuller and happier lives if they 
choose legal marriage rather than staying single, or just living with someone else,” 
compared to 32% of teenage girls (http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/pathways2adulthood/ch3.-
shtml#How). Though marriage and women’s expectation of it may continue to shift and 
change, Beauvoir writes, “Modern marriage can be understood only in the light of the 
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past it perpetuates,” (Beauvoir, 439) and for women, the past and sometimes present of 
marriage include situations like that of Barbara Rose. 
 As noted in the Introduction, Kaplan (1974) argues that existential crises are better 
represented in film by women since women are less shielded by external projects (19). 
For Beauvoir, the same is true for almost all women because they are relegated to the 
sphere of immanence. As a dark comedy, The War of the Roses (1989) cuts to the heart of 
the married woman’s existential crisis and is full of dialogue that conveys many of the 
same situations Beauvoir describes. The film is narrated by Gavin D’Amato (Danny 
DeVito), who tells the story of the Roses to a man who has come to him in hopes of 
retaining his counsel for his impending divorce.  
The story of the Roses, which Gavin tells his prospective client he kept out of the 
newspapers, begins when the future couple meets at an auction in Nantucket on the last 
day of the tourist season. Barbara (Kathleen Turner) spiritedly outbids Oliver (Michael 
Douglas) on an ivory figurine. Oliver approaches her after the auction and asks if she 
knows what the figurine is worth. She replies that she does not and simply “liked” the 
figurine, which according to Oliver is worth five times more than her winning bid. The 
two continue to chat, and Oliver tells her that he is a law student at Harvard, and Barbara 
explains that she is attending Madison on a gymnastics scholarship.  
 Oliver’s sexual interest in Barbara is obvious from the time the two first begin 
conversing. It is raining, and Barbara’s shirt has become transparent. When Barbara tells 
him she is a gymnast and demonstrates by standing on her hands and performing a split, 
Oliver remarks, “God, I love Nantucket.” Already, the two reflect Beauvoir’s description 
of the “moral and social superiority” of many husbands to their wives:  
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He has the advantage of culture or at least professional training over his wife; since 
adolescence, he has been interested in world affairs: they are his affairs; he knows a 
little law, he follows politics, he belongs to a party, a union, clubs; worker and 
citizen, his thinking is connected to action; he knows that one cannot cheat reality: 
that is, the average man has the technique of reasoning, the taste for facts and 
experience, a certain critical sense; here is what many girls lack; even if they have 
read, listened to lectures, touched upon the fine arts, their knowledge amassed here 
and there does not constitute culture; it is not because of an intellectual defect that 
they have not learned to reason: it is because they have not had to practice it. 
(Beauvoir, 497)  
 
Barbara bids on the figurine simply because she likes it, and not because she knows its 
actual value. Oliver is “cultured” enough to know what it is worth, and the impression is 
that he bid on the figurine because of calculation rather than whim.  
Both Oliver and Barbara are attending college on scholarships; “I’m not rich, just 
brilliant,” Oliver tells her. Barbara has earned her gymnastics scholarship because of her 
body and physical conditioning rather than her “brilliance,” and her handstand and 
attractive figure speak for themselves. Though Barbara may indeed “amass knowledge 
here and there” since she attends college, her purpose there is firmly rooted in the realm 
of the body and immanence, and she tells Oliver that she is already becoming “too big” to 
be a successful gymnast. In contrast, Oliver’s college experience is in the realm of the 
mind and transcendence, and his future as a lawyer who will certainly know more than 
just “a little law” is wide open and full of promise. 
 Oliver succeeds in convincing Barbara to stay with him in Nantucket for the night, 
and the two spend the evening having sex that for Barbara is multi-orgasmic, something 
for which Oliver tells her she should never apologize. “If we end up together, then this is 
the most romantic day of my life. And if we don’t, I’m a complete slut,” Barbara tells 
him (The War of the Roses, 1989). “This is the story we’re going to tell our 
 
 
46 
 
grandchildren,” he replies, an answer that grants Barbara the security of knowing his 
intentions are more than just a one-night stand. Beauvoir notes that “...Americans today, 
who are both respectful of the institution of marriage and individualistic, endeavor to 
integrate sexuality into marriage” (Beauvoir, 456-457). So it is with the Oliver and 
Barbara, and the film cuts away from the scene of their first sexual encounter into a scene 
at Christmastime in which the couple is now married.  
Oliver sits working at a desk while the couple’s two young children make mischief 
and distract him, and it is inferred from their ages and the cramped apartment that Oliver 
is still at the beginning of his law career. Oliver is inept at dealing with the children, and 
when Barbara comes home and greets them all, the reception the children give her makes 
it clear that they are far more attached to her than they are to their father. Barbara gives 
each of the children a piece of candy, and Oliver asks her if it is a good idea to give the 
children sweets all the time. Barbara replies that she’s “read somewhere” that freely 
giving children candy will dampen their desire for it and prevent them from becoming 
obese.  
Oliver obviously doubts Barbara’s rationale for constantly giving the children candy, 
and the scene illustrates the divide between what he perceives as logic and reason and 
what Barbara herself believes them to be. Beauvoir writes,  
Even if their age difference is slight, the fact remains that the young woman and 
young man have generally been brought up very differently; she is the product of a 
feminine universe where she was inculcated with feminine sagacity and respect for 
feminine values, whereas he is imbued with the male ethic. It is often very difficult 
for them to understand each other, and conflicts soon arise. (Beauvoir, 493) 
 
The conflict arises in the very next scene when Barbara shows Oliver the star she has 
made to put atop the Christmas tree. Though Barbara has obviously worked hard on the 
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star, when she asks Oliver what he thinks of it, he replies, “It looks like it’s made out of 
tinfoil.” Barbara quickly conceals her hurt, and in another effort to please him, she brings 
Oliver outside to show him her Christmas gift to him: a Morgan, a classic car for him to 
lovingly restore. This time Oliver is ecstatic with Barbara’s effort, though he asks if they 
can truly afford it. Fulfilling her role as a dutifully supportive wife, Barbara replies, 
“You’re going to be such a huge success, this may be out last opportunity to worry about 
spending money!” (The War of the Roses, 1989) When Barbara asks if Oliver is happy, 
he replies, “I’m more than happy. I’m way past happy. I’m married!” (The War of the 
Roses, 1989)  
 Oliver seems to take his happiness for granted as though it is his right as a husband, 
but the sacrifices Barbara has made to achieve it cannot be overlooked. Though her future 
as a gymnast was already uncertain when she met Oliver, she gave it up completely when 
she married him and bore his children. From that moment on, Barbara lives for 
supporting Oliver in his endeavors, raising the children, and running the house. In turn, 
Oliver lives up to her expectations of his success, and after only six months with his new 
firm, he meets with the senior partners in hopes of becoming a partner himself.  
The meeting takes place at his and Barbara’s house, now a considerably larger 
dwelling than their first apartment, over a fantastic dinner she has spared no effort in 
preparing. Though she is complimented on the meal by one of the senior partner’s wives, 
the children enter the room asking for extra helpings of dessert to take upstairs with them, 
and it is clear that both of them are indeed obese. Barbara’s success at preparing the 
dinner is overshadowed by the failed logic of her strategy to prevent the children from 
becoming obese by constantly feeding them sweets, and it is clear as Oliver hurries the 
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children out of the room that he is embarrassed by them. Oliver humiliates Barbara 
further when he requests that she tell the guests the story of how she and Oliver had 
acquired their crystal, then impatiently cuts her off in the middle of an anecdote about the 
chipped glasses with yellow flowers of her childhood and finishes the story himself.  
 Later that night as the couple lie in bed, Barbara seethes at Oliver for not only 
embarrassing her, but also his “phony laugh” and other bootlicking behavior in the 
presence of the guests. Oliver defends himself, explaining that his desire to be made a 
partner in the firm is because of her and the children. Remorsefully, he tells Barbara, 
“God, I hope they didn’t notice what a jerk I am,” to which she replies, “They never seem 
to” (The War of the Roses, 1989). Though they “make up” and share a kiss and a laugh 
directly after Barbara’s reply, it is clear that she did not mean it in jest, and a major shift 
has occurred. Beauvoir writes,  
Even if she started out recognizing masculine prestige, her dazzlement is soon 
dissipated; one day the child recognizes that his father is but a contingent individual; 
the wife soon discovers she is not before the grand Suzerain, the Chief, the Master, 
but a man; she sees no reason to be subjugated to him; in her eyes, he merely 
represents unjust and unrewarding duty. (Beauvoir, 500) 
 
Something has awakened in Barbara. She now sees Oliver as a fallible, thankless, and 
sometimes simpering man rather than a god, and she begins her search for ways to 
express autonomy. Barbara has repeatedly expressed her interest in purchasing a 
particular house if the owner should decide to sell it, and in the act of leaving yet another 
note of interest at the house, Barbara learns that the owner has passed away, and that a 
wake is taking place at that very moment. Barbara has “won” the house of her dreams, 
but the victory comes with a price.  
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 A few scenes later, Barbara wanders amidst the beautiful interior of the house 
needlessly rearranging knickknacks by shifting them mere inches from their original 
positions, and in the voiceover, Gavin D’Amato explains,  
Barbara labored seven days a week to create the perfect home that Oliver always 
dreamed of. Not easy for a girl who drew up drinking her milk from glasses with 
chipped yellow flowers. There were a million choices, and she sweated every one of 
them. She refinished all the tables herself. It took six months to get the floors exactly 
right. A hundred Sundays to find the perfect Staffordshire figures and plates that she 
put over the fireplace. When you work that hard on something, eventually you have to 
finish and face the awful question: What’s left to do? (The War of the Roses, 1989) 
 
Barbara’s life has become exactly what Beauvoir describes in the following:  
She will also find in this décor an expression of her personality; it is she who has 
chosen, made, and ‘hunted down’ furniture and knickknacks, who has aesthetically 
arranged them in a way where symmetry is important; they reflect her individuality 
while bearing social witness to her standard of living...Because she does nothing, she 
avidly seeks herself in what she has. (Beauvoir, 471, emphasis in the original).  
 
Beauvoir writes of an elderly woman she knew “among others” who at twenty was “gay 
and coquettish,” but in later years began awakening every morning at five to obsessively 
rearrange the wardrobes in the house: “Closed up in her isolated estate, with a husband 
who neglected her and a single child, she took to arranging as others take to drink,” 
Beauvoir writes (Beauvoir, 477).  
“What’s left to do” is indeed the awful question that faces the married woman when 
domestic duties and childrearing no longer occupy all of her time. Mann3 points out that 
in all manner of stories and fairytales, what happens beyond the “happily ever after” is 
almost never revealed, and marriage itself is often presented as its own happy ending. But 
life goes on after marriage for real-life husbands and wives, and for a woman who has 
devoted the majority of her existence to her husband and children, answering the question 
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of “What next” can be agonizing, if not impossible. Barbara, however, is fortunate 
enough to find an answer. 
 After years of painstakingly preparing meals for her family and Oliver’s business 
associates, Barbara’s culinary skills are honed to near-perfection. She enters Oliver’s 
study and hesitantly explains that one of their friends had remarked that her pâté was 
good enough to sell, then bought a pound of it from her. “You sold liver to our friends?” 
Oliver asks derisively. “She paid me in cash, Oliver,” Barbara replies. “Somehow that 
felt different than the money I get cashing a check. Made me feel like trading in the 
Volvo on one of those four-wheel-drive things with the big knobby tires and the 200-
horsepower engine. So I did. I’m going to pick it up tomorrow,” she adds.  
Dumbfounded, Oliver asks how much the truck cost. Barbara replies that it was 
$25,000. “So you only have to sell 700 more pounds of pâté,” Oliver remarks 
sarcastically. “Maybe I will. Maybe I’m starting a business,” Barbara replies, and it is 
clear that she is shocked by the idea herself. Beauvoir writes,  
To increase his authority, he likes to exaggerate feminine incapacity; she accepts this 
subordinate role with more or less docility. We have seen the surprised pleasure of 
women who, sincerely regretting their husbands’ absence, discover in themselves at 
such times unsuspected possibilities; they run businesses, bring up children, decide 
and administer without help. They suffer when their husbands return and doom her 
again to incompetence. (Beauvoir, 499) 
 
After years of Oliver’s absence as a result of his workaholic tendencies, Barbara finds an 
unsuspected possibility for exercising autonomy by making use of her skill in the kitchen 
to start a business. Oliver’s attitude toward the whole endeavor is condescending and 
indulgent, as if Barbara is merely playing at “important” work. However, as Barbara’s 
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business grows and becomes more successful, it is Oliver who recognizes that hiring 
outside help to care for the house is necessary.  
 At first, Barbara is completely opposed to the idea of hiring help to care for the house. 
Predictably, Oliver cannot understand her reluctance. It is a simple and logical fact for 
him that she cannot run a successful business and perform the domestic labor necessary 
to care for their huge home. Beauvoir writes, “It is through housework that the wife 
comes to make her ‘nest’ her own; this is why, even if she has ‘help,’ she insists on doing 
things herself” (Beauvoir, 472). Though Barbara now has her business, she is loath to 
turn the care of the ‘nest’ she has devoted years to building over to someone else.  
While interviewing the woman who will become their new housekeeper, Barbara 
delivers a monologue that cuts straight to the heart of the married woman’s existential 
crisis:  
Let’s face it, I don’t need to work. I mean, not for the money. And that does not 
necessarily make me one of these women who is married to a successful man and has 
dedicated her life to him and her children and then finds herself desperately trying to 
validate herself as a human being because her children are about to leave her by 
studying photography or opening an art gallery or going into interior design in her 
husband’s office. No, I have a wonderful house crammed with beautiful things. I did 
this house myself. I did a great job. Not that I’m necessarily a slave to materialism 
though, but I am proud of what I’ve accomplished, although I suppose some people 
would find my life disgusting...No, disgusting is too strong a word. I would say that 
not many people would respect the choices I’ve made, although women would. 
Women like me. (The War of the Roses, 1989) 
 
From this point on, free from domestic obligations and exercising her own authority over 
her business, Barbara becomes more and more aware of her contempt for Oliver. She 
asks him to look over a contract she has drawn up for a client, and he uses it to swat a fly, 
all the while making it clear how amusing and insignificant he considers her business 
endeavors to be. When the two share a meal, Barbara can hardly bear to watch Oliver 
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consume the food she has prepared. She hears him on the phone with an important 
colleague, and his phony laugh that annoyed her years before has now become more than 
she can stand.  
 Though all the signs are present that Oliver and Barbara’s marriage is irreparable, it 
takes Oliver suffering what at first seems to be a heart attack but is actually a massive of 
attack of indigestion for Barbara to realize that she wants a divorce. Barbara fails to go to 
the hospital when she learns Oliver is there, and he is appalled by her lack of concern for 
him. Later that night, after he has come home, confronted her, and gone to bed, she 
wakes him to tell him that awful reason why: because when she heard the news that he 
might be dying, she was overcome with a happiness she found so frightening that she had 
to pull the car over to the side of the road. “I want a divorce,” she concludes. “You can’t 
have one!” Oliver replies furiously, and demands that she gives him a reason that “makes 
sense.”  
Barbara obliges him with the awful truth: “Because when I watch you eat, when I see 
you asleep, when I look at you lately, I just want to smash your face in,” she answers. 
Once again, Oliver fails to take her seriously, and derisively eggs her on to “take a shot” 
at him. When Barbara does exactly that and succeeds in drawing blood, he replies, “Next 
time, I hit back. And you better get yourself a damn good lawyer.” Thus, war has been 
declared, and it will culminate in the destruction of both the Roses. The remainder of the 
film becomes a battle between Oliver and Barbara for possessions.  
Barbara offers to waive alimony in exchange for the house and its contents, but 
Oliver refuses. Though he has moved out of the house, Oliver finds a loophole in the law 
that allows him to move back in, much to Barbara’s horror, and the situation quickly 
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becomes even more toxic. Christmas arrives yet again, and in an act of defiance and 
reclamation of her own identity, Barbara tops the tree with the tinfoil star she made so 
many years before. After she does so, a strand of lights on the tree goes out, and Oliver 
ignores Barbara’s warning that it is due to a short in the wiring. Hours later, the tree 
catches fire, destroying the gifts and damaging the living room. Without Barbara’s loving 
indulgence, Oliver’s incompetence is not only visible, but also unforgiveable.  
Beauvoir recounts the disturbing story of a wife desperate to free herself from her 
husband:  
A forty-year-old woman who had endured an odious husband for twenty years was 
recently acquitted for having coldly strangled her husband with the help of her elder 
son. There had been no other way for her to free herself from an intolerable situation. 
(Beauvoir, 515).  
 
Barbara and Oliver’s situation becomes increasingly worse, with each of them carrying 
out more and more comically outlandish plots to drive the other out of the house or, in 
Oliver’s case, to hold onto Barbara as one of his rightful possessions. In one of the final 
scenes of the film, after the two have literally barricaded themselves inside the house 
with the intent of battling to the death, Oliver lures Barbara out of hiding by placing the 
figurine she won at the auction where they first met on the banister of the staircase. “I’ll 
give you everything in this house if you say it’s mine,” he tells her, indicating the 
figurine. “Okay,” she replies, “it’s mine,” and Oliver flies into an uncontrollable rage. 
Barbara’s refusal to give Oliver ownership of the figurine, which truly does belong to 
her, is clearly symbolic of her refusal to consent to his ownership of her as a person and a 
wife. Oliver rushes her on the staircase, and after another scuffle, the two end up in the 
huge chandelier overhanging the foyer, a hundred feet above the marble floor. Though 
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help arrives in the form of Gavin D’Amato and the Roses’ housekeeper, Barbara has 
loosened the bolts of the chandelier in an earlier plot to drop it on Oliver. The tension 
wires finally give way under the weight of them both, and Oliver and Barbara plummet to 
their death. As the two lie amidst the wreckage of the chandelier, Oliver uses the last of 
his dying strength to place his hand on Barbara’s shoulder. In turn, Barbara uses the last 
of her strength to push it off. Both are casualties in the war of the Roses, but having 
refused to live as a woman bound to Oliver by marriage, Barbara refuses to die as one as 
well.  
 
Amanda Bonner 
Adam’s Rib (1949) belongs to the subgenre of romantic comedies known as the 
“screwball comedy” (Shumway, 1991). Contrary to Cavell’s (1981) analysis, Shumway 
1991) argues that screwball comedies mystify marriage:  
Where Cavell goes wrong—and it is hardly a peripheral place—is his position that 
the screwball comedies he discusses succeed in enlightening us about marriage itself. 
My argument is that they do just the opposite: they mystify marriage by portraying it 
as the goal—but not the end—of romance. The major cultural work of these films is 
not the stimulation of thought about marriage, but the affirmation of marriage in the 
face of the threat of a growing divorce rate and liberalized divorce laws. What an 
analysis of screwball comedies will show is that romance functions as a specific 
ideology that is used by these films to mystify marriage. (Shumway, 7)  
 
Though Cavell (1981) treats Adam’s Rib as a comedy of remarriage, Shumway (1991) 
points out that Amanda and Adam Bonner never actually divorce in the film (Shumway, 
17). Shumway also argues that, unlike most other films in the comedy of remarriage 
genre, Adam’s Rib is specifically concerned with feminist issues (Shumway, 17).  
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Amanda Bonner (Katharine Hepburn) takes the case of a woman who has shot her 
husband and constructs her defense on the premise that women as a class are not treated 
equally before the eyes of the law with regard to the issue of infidelity. Shumway writes, 
“Her defense of this woman is explicitly a defense of women as a class and a protest 
against the double-standard of sexual morality that generally excuses male philandering 
(something that the father in The Philadelphia Story did explicitly)” (Shumway, 17).  
Both the plot of Adam’s Rib and the character of Amanda Bonner are atypical for 
comedies of remarriage, supporting Shumway’s argument that the film more properly 
belongs to the screwball comedy genre instead.  
 Though she is a married woman, Amanda Bonner shares little else in common with 
Barbara Rose. Like her husband Adam (Spencer Tracy), Amanda is a lawyer. She 
attended Yale and has a successful career that she did not abandon when she married. 
Amanda and Adam occupy a suite in the city to be closer to their work, but they also 
have a lovely estate in the country which they refer to as “the cottage.” Unlike Barbara 
Rose, Amanda Bonner employs several maids to perform domestic duties that, as a 
working woman, she does not have time to perform herself. The couple has no children, 
and it is clear that Amanda’s two biggest priorities are her work and her husband. Unlike 
many of the married women Beauvoir describes in the previous section, Amanda is free 
from the drudgeries of housework and is defined by what she does rather than what she 
has. Amanda does not express her personality through the décor of her house, but through 
the action she engages in professionally and through the causes she believes in instead.  
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Amanda and Adam’s relationship appears to be an example of equality within the 
framework of marriage, and their genuine affection for each other is obvious from the 
beginning of the film. Beauvoir writes,  
This balanced couple is not a utopia; such couples exist sometimes even within 
marriage, more often outside of it; some are united by a great sexual love that leaves 
them free in their friendships and occupations; others are linked by a friendship that 
does not hamper their sexual freedom; more rarely there are still others who are both 
lovers and friends but without seeking in each other their exclusive reason for living. 
Many nuances are possible in the relations of a man and a woman: in companionship, 
pleasure, confidence, tenderness, complicity, and love, they can be for each other the 
most fruitful source of joy, richness, and strength offered to a human being. 
(Beauvoir, 520) 
 
Though Amanda and Adam’s relationship appears to be nearly equal, it is Amanda’s 
commitment to the causes she believes in that ultimately causes the greatest difficulty 
between the two.  
Free from the problems that plague many of Beauvoir’s married women, the strife 
between husband and wife in the Bonner’s case occurs in the realm of ideas which, for 
Beauvoir, is characteristic of transcendence. “Woman is destined to maintain the species 
and care for the home, which is to say, to immanence,” Beauvoir writes (443). Amanda 
Bonner is not anchored to the realm of immanence by either of these duties however, and 
though she loves her husband, her existence is firmly based on her own pursuits. He is 
not her “exclusive reason for living,” and she has not made the sacrifices that other 
married women such as Barbara Rose make when they enter into marriage. 
The opening sequence of the film begins with Doris Attinger (Judy Holliday) 
following her husband, Warren Attinger (Tom Ewell), through the crowded streets of 
New York, taking great care not to be seen by him. Doris is then shown purchasing a 
handgun and an instruction manual which she nervously thumbs through, demonstrating 
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her unfamiliarity with firearms. In the next scene, Doris arrives at an apartment building 
Warren has entered moments before, and with the gun in hand, she charges into one of 
the apartments to find him sitting on a sofa embracing another woman. Though terrified, 
Doris turns her head away, closes her eyes, and blindly fires the gun in the direction of 
Warren and his mistress. Warren’s mistress manages to escape from the room, but Doris 
succeeds in wounding Warren, and sobbing hysterically, she immediately rushes over to 
where he lies on the floor.  
As Shumway (1991) notes, this love triangle is not at all appealing to the audience 
and suggests that elements of class are at work in the film’s construction of romance (17). 
Later scenes confirm that the Attingers are indeed from a lower social, educational, and 
economic class than the Bonners. However, since Adam’s Rib premiered in 1949, the 
influence of the Production Code may also be responsible for the unappealing 
representation of the adulterous affair between Warren Attinger and his mistress.  
The next scene takes place at the Bonner residence the morning after the shooting. 
Amanda sees the story of the shooting in the newspaper and mentions it to Adam, who 
regards the whole incident as an ugly mess. “Serves him right, the little two-timer,” says 
one of the Bonner’s maids as she clears away the newspapers. When Adam, an assistant 
district attorney, arrives at city hall, his colleagues are also discussing the Attinger 
shooting. Adam refers to Doris Attinger as a “hysterical Hannah who tried to kill her 
husband,” and almost immediately afterwards learns that he will be trying the case 
against her.  
Meanwhile, Amanda asks one of the assistants at her law office what she thinks of a 
man who cheats on his wife. “Not a very nice thing,” her assistant replies. But when 
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Amanda asks her what she thinks of a woman who cheats on her husband, her assistant 
replies, “Something terrible.” Amanda asks her, “Why ‘not nice’ if he does it and 
‘something terrible’ if she does?” a question her assistant is unable to answer. Then, after 
a phone call from Adam informing Amanda that he has been assigned the case, she 
dispatches her assistant to arrange an interview with Doris Attinger.  
During the interview, when Amanda asks her how long she has been married, Doris 
promptly replies, “Nine years, four months, and twelve days.” Doris reveals that her 
husband has been physically assaulting her, and is able to give Amanda the precise date 
of when the first instance of abuse occurred. Doris also reveals that the couple has three 
children, and that her husband had failed to come home for four nights in a row before 
the morning she followed him to his mistress’s apartment. When Amanda asks her 
whether she questioned her husband’s behavior, Doris replies, “Certainly! He told me to 
shut up and mind my own business.”  
Beauvoir writes,  
If she is too indulgent, the wife finds her husband escaping her...Yet if she forbids 
him all adventure, if she overwhelms him by her close scrutiny, her scenes, her 
demands, she can seriously turn him against her. It is a question of knowing how to 
‘make concessions’ advisedly; if the husband puts ‘a few dents in the contract,’ she 
will close her eyes; but at other moments, she must open them wide (Beauvoir, 506).  
 
Doris is a wife no longer in a position to make concessions. After her husband’s 
prolonged absence, her eyes are “open wide,” and she takes desperate measures. Though 
Doris freely admits to shooting her husband, the information she gives Amanda during 
the interview evokes sympathy rather than condemnation. Her precise knowledge of how 
long she has been married, her willingness to accept the initial dents her husband has put 
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in the contract, and the mistreatment she has endured make her appear to be a devoted 
wife at her wit’s end rather than a dangerous and unstable threat.  
Though Amanda’s interview with Doris evokes sympathy, Adam’s interview with 
Warren Attinger evokes nothing but contempt. Warren is still in the hospital receiving 
treatment for his gunshot wound, and he is understandably furious. He rants that Doris is 
a “nut” and that he wants her “put away.” Though his fury is understandable, the 
audience has witnessed the events leading up to the shooting and knows of his infidelity. 
He has been shot, but his anger with Doris and refusal to acknowledge her actions in the 
context of his own bad behavior make it difficult to feel sympathy for him. Instead, he 
appears to be every bit the boorish and unlikeable man Doris describes in her interview. 
The result is that Doris appears to be the true victim in the situation even though she is 
responsible for Warren’s injury.  
The individuals present during the two interviews also add to the construction of the 
situation as a battle between the sexes. Whereas the only individuals present for Doris’s 
interview are the other women seated at the table with her, several men are present in the 
hospital room during Warren’s interview. Doris’s interview is quiet, intimate, and gives 
the impression of commiseration between her and the other women. Conversely, the 
atmosphere of Warren’s interview is chaotic; the room is crowded and noisy, and none of 
the men are seated. Instead, they are milling around and talking over one another, and 
they all seem to be engaged in their own purpose and agenda.  
Later that evening, the Bonners are at home preparing for a dinner party. Adam gives 
Amanda a hat he has purchased as a gift for her; “Just the best hat in the world for the 
best head,” he tells her. The scene affirms that Adam is a “good husband” who dotes on 
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his wife and establishes him as the polar opposite of Warren Attinger. The happiness of 
the exchange is marred, however, by Amanda breaking the news that she is representing 
Doris Attinger. Though the arrival of the guests prevent a full-blown confrontation 
between Adam and Amanda, Adam is clearly upset throughout the evening, and the 
obnoxious behavior of the Bonners’ neighbor, Kip Lurie (David Wayne), and his open 
flirtation with Amanda adds to the tension.  
After the guests have gone home, the delayed confrontation between Amanda and 
Adam finally occurs, and the two argue heatedly. Adam accuses Amanda of wanting to 
turn a court of law into a “Punch and Judy show.” The greatest source of his outrage is 
not that Amanda has taken the case, but that she believes Doris should be acquitted. “I am 
going to cut you into twelve little pieces and feed you to the jury, so get prepared for it,” 
he tells her.  Surprisingly, instead of retorting, Amanda merely kisses him goodnight, and 
the two go to bed instead of arguing further.  
Beauvoir notes that, for some married women, rejecting the principles of their 
husbands is a form of resistance:  
In spite of opinions she has learned and principles she reels off like a parrot, the wife 
retains her own vision of the world. This resistance can render her incapable of 
understanding a husband smarter than herself; or, on the contrary, she will rise above 
masculine seriousness like the heroines of Stendhal or Ibsen. Sometimes, out of 
hostility toward the man—either because he has sexually disappointed her or, on the 
contrary, because he dominates her and she wants revenge—she will clutch onto 
values that are not his (Beauvoir, 500).  
 
Every scene between Amanda and Adam gives the impression that they are happily 
married and still very much in love. Though the film contains no scenes of sexual 
intimacy between Adam and Amanda and they are shown as occupying separate beds, 
these are standard features of films made under the Production Code (Cavell, 1981; 
 
 
61 
 
Krzywinska, 2006), and the intimacy between them is successfully depicted in other 
ways.  
Amanda is not opposing Adam out of hostility due to sexual dissatisfaction, nor does 
she give the impression that she seeks revenge for his domination. Instead, she makes it 
clear that she views the Attinger case as a way to fight for a greater cause (“You’re cute 
when you get causey,” Adam tells her earlier in the film). Adam, however, views the case 
only in terms of the laws that have been broken rather than its association with the larger 
issue of women’s equality. For him, the case is open-and-shut: Doris Attinger broke the 
law, endangered the lives of two individuals, and has confessed to shooting her husband. 
Amanda’s resistance toward acknowledging these facts is what causes the strife between 
them, as does Adam’s refusal to consider her vision of the case as an opportunity to strike 
a blow for equality.  
 The next morning at court, it becomes clear that Adam’s fear of the case becoming a 
Punch and Judy show is well-founded. To his shock and outrage, Doris Attinger appears 
in court wearing the hat he gave Amanda the night before. During voir dire, Amanda 
announces that the entire basis of her case will be women’s equality:  
I submit that me entire line of defense is based on the proposition that persons of the 
female sex should be dealt with before the law as the equal of persons of the male 
sex. I submit that I cannot hope to argue this line before minds hostile to and 
prejudiced against the female sex. (Adam’s Rib, 1949) 
 
In ironic contrast to Amanda’s speech, she and Adam duck under the tables to flirt with 
each other. She lifts the hem of her skirt to flash the lace of her slip at Adam and 
succeeds in flustering him to the point that he stumbles over his words when he questions 
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the next juror. Amanda’s clear use of her sexuality as a strategy to gain the upper hand in 
court seems ethically at odds her speech on the equal treatment of women before the law. 
Later that evening, when Adam returns home, Amanda greets him at the door with a 
drink and sympathetic adoration, flawlessly fulfilling the role of the “good wife.” Adam 
asks her again to drop the case. “It’ll get sillier and messier day by day,” he tells her. “I 
can’t. It’s my cause,” Amanda replies. In an emotional plea for his understanding, 
Amanda tells him, “Listen darling, I know that deep down you agree with me, with 
everything I want and hope and believe in. We couldn’t be so close if you didn’t—if I 
didn’t feel that you did” (Adam’s Rib, 1949).  Again, the difference between their views 
of the case is highlighted: For Amanda, the case represents a larger and much graver 
injustice: the social and juridical inequality of women. For Adam, however, it is a simple 
matter of guilt or innocence before the eyes of the law, and the facts (such as Doris 
Attinger’s signed confession) speak for themselves. 
 Though Shumway (1991) argues that Adam’s Rib “displaces the social conflict onto 
the drama of a single marriage,” and that the marriage itself is depicted as one of 
“absolute bliss,” (Shumway, 18) the way Adam and Amanda’s relationship is portrayed 
affirms more than marriage as a value to be upheld. In the scene following Amanda’s 
emotional appeal to Adam, the couple prepares dinner together. The task is clearly a joint 
effort with the work divided evenly between them; it is neither an expression of a woman 
fulfilling her “wifely duty” nor the bumbling antics of a husband who is completely 
unfamiliar with the kitchen and only succeeds in making a nuisance of himself. Instead, 
the scene depicts an equality that, like Adam’s view of the case, is practical and 
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pragmatic, and seems to suggest that Amanda’s preoccupation with the larger social issue 
of equality is somewhat silly since it is exemplified in her own lived experience. 
Beauvoir acknowledges that, especially in America, the institution of marriage was 
already changing as she was writing The Second Sex:  
Considering the abstract rights they enjoy, they are almost equals; they choose each 
other more freely than before, they can separate much more easily, especially in 
America, where divorce is commonplace; there is less difference in age and culture 
between spouses than previously; the husband more easily acknowledges the 
autonomy of his wife’s claims; they might even share housework equally...Many 
young couples give the impression of perfect equality. (Beauvoir, 521) 
 
More than a representation of perfect marital bliss, the Bonner’s marriage is a depiction 
of a functional kind of equality, and it is at least a partially honest one since it also 
highlights the difficulties of married life. Adam and Amanda share the same educational 
background and profession. The home movie they show their guests earlier in the film 
features them engaging in tennis and other sports together. They do, as Beauvoir 
suggests, give the notion of perfect equality. However, as Shumway (1991) argues, the 
film ultimately does affirm the patriarchal status quo (Shumway, 18), but it also provides 
a critique of the ideal of sexual equality itself.  
 As Amanda enjoys more and more success in court, relations between her and Adam 
become increasingly strained. As the two unwind after yet another day of legal drama, 
Amanda playfully spanks Adam after giving him a massage. However, when Adam 
finishes Amanda’s massage by spanking her as well, she is horrified and accuses him of 
“really meaning it.” Beauvoir writes, “Logic in masculine hands is often violence,” 
(Beauvoir, 498) and Amanda makes the same accusation against Adam: “I’m not so sure 
I care to expose myself to typical instinctive masculine brutality,” she rages. After Adam 
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finally admits that he is “sore” at Amanda and ashamed of her for “shaking the law by the 
tail,” Amanda begins to cry. Adam replies with what amounts to a parallel criticism of a 
“typical” feminine response to conflict:  
Here we go again, the old juice. Guaranteed heart-melter. A few female tears, 
stronger than any acid. But this time it won’t work. You can cry from now until the 
time when the jury comes in, and it won’t make you right. And it won’t win you that 
silly case. (Adam’s Rib, 1949)   
 
Adam’s speech only enrages Amanda further, and she kicks him in the shin, yelling 
“Let’s all be manly!” Coupled with her earlier use of sexuality to gain an edge in court, 
this scene seems to suggest that, despite her professed commitment to the ideal of 
equality, Amanda is willing to rely upon traditional notions of gender when it suits her.  
 The next day in court, Amanda submits into evidence several female witnesses who 
boast of considerable professional, intellectual, and physical achievements in order to 
demonstrate that women are equal to men in every respect. The demonstration culminates 
in Amanda instructing one of the witnesses to bodily lift Adam off the ground to prove 
her strength, humiliating him and securing a front-page photo of the incident in the 
newspaper. Later that evening, Adam accuses Amanda of having contempt not only for 
the law, but also for the institution of marriage itself. In a speech that makes his views on 
marriage explicitly clear, Adam tells Amanda,  
I’ve done it all the way I said I would. In sickness and health, richer or poorer, better 
or worse, but this is too worse. This is basic. I’m old-fashioned. I like two sexes. And 
another thing, all of a sudden I don’t like being married to what is known as a ‘new 
woman.’ I want a wife, not a competitor. If you want to be a big he-woman, go on 
and do it, but not with me. (Adam’s Rib, 1949)   
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Despite her earlier condemnation of “typical instinctive masculine brutality,” Amanda 
responds to Adam’s speech by physically shoving him, and he angrily leaves their home, 
marking the beginning of the couple’s estrangement.  
Though the Bonners’ relationship may appear to be one of perfect equality on the 
surface, Adam’s speech demonstrates that it is indeed an illusion since for him it is rooted 
in traditional notions of a wife’s role. Amanda has committed a transgression by 
assuming the role of a serious competitor, and Adam considers the “new woman” to be 
unfeminine, as his choice of the term “he-woman” indicates. The scene reveals that 
Amanda and Adam are both working from a double standard of equality, and each 
believe that exceptions apply within the context of marriage, although they disagree on 
which exceptions, and when.  
 In the final day of court proceedings, Amanda triumphs over Adam when the jury 
returns a “not guilty” verdict for Doris Attinger. However, though Amanda has won the 
case, the tension between her and Adam indicates that it might have cost her their 
marriage. Later that evening, while Amanda is visiting Kip, the flirtatious neighbor, she 
is clearly too preoccupied with thoughts of Adam to even acknowledge Kip’s amorous 
advances. While at Kip’s apartment, Amanda delivers a monologue in which she 
describes her specific beliefs concerning sexual equality and its relationship to marriage:  
I may be wrong about much, about plenty, but about this...about marriage, what it’s 
supposed to be, what makes it work or perfect. Balance, equality, mutual everything. 
There’s no room in marriage for what used to be known as the ‘little’ woman. She’s 
got to be as big as the man is. Sharing, that’s what it takes to make a marriage, keep a 
marriage from getting sick from all the duties and responsibilities...and trouble. 
Listen, no part of marriage is the exclusive province of any one sex. Now why can’t 
he see that? (Adam’s Rib, 1949)   
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Amanda’s speech again highlights the film’s honest portrayal of the conflicts that 
characterize married life. 
Beauvoir writes, “No one dreams of denying the tragedies and nastiness of married 
life; but advocates of marriage defend the idea that spouses’ conflicts arise out of the bad 
faith of individuals and not out of the institution’s” (Beauvoir, 506). Amanda fully 
acknowledges the problems that accompany married life, and the solution she proposes is 
the same as Beauvoir’s: only by basing marriage on equality can both individual 
marriages and the institution itself hope to survive. Following Amanda’s speech, 
however, the viewer is again reminded that, despite her passionate arguments concerning 
the need for sexual equality, Amanda herself is guilty of holding double standards. 
Brandishing a gun, Adam bursts through the door as Kip is once again attempting to 
embrace Amanda. Kip panics and cowers behind her, but Amanda boldly tells Adam he 
has “no right” to threaten them in such a way. This spells victory for Adam, who replies, 
“No matter what you think you think, you think the same as me. No one has the right to 
break the law.” Amanda may have won a symbolic victory in court, but Adam has won a 
practical victory in demonstrating that she shares his beliefs regardless of her statements 
to the contrary. Adam “knows best” after all, and though Shumway (1991) argues that the 
patriarchal status quo is reaffirmed when Adam is awarded a judgeship in the closing 
scenes of the film (18), the true victory occurs when his threat of violence—the very 
same threat made by Doris Attinger against her husband and his mistress—forces 
Amanda to agree with him. Unlike Doris Attinger, however, Adam’s actions do not 
evoke sympathy, but he is saved from condemnation by the audience and eventually 
Amanda herself when he reveals that the gun he wields is actually made of black licorice.  
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Though the candy gun provides both comic relief and an affirmation that Adam’s 
character is essentially “good,” Amanda is understandably furious about his deceptive 
and frightening stunt, and the audience is left to wonder whether the relationship can ever 
be repaired. Adam, however, has one more trick up his sleeve. In the next scene, Amanda 
and Adam are at their accountant’s office discussing tax deductions for the year. Amanda 
is distant, and the atmosphere is strained. However, when Adam turns to the window and 
begins to cry, Amanda immediately abandons her grudge and rushes to comfort him.  
The couple heads to their farm in the country for rest and repair, and in the final 
scenes of the film, Amanda is once again trying on the hat Adam gave her and that Doris 
Attinger wore during the trial when Adam reveals his last and perhaps best trick. To 
Amanda’s disbelief, Adam demonstrates that he too can cry if he chooses, and reminds 
her that his tears are what ultimately won her back. The irony of his use of tears as a 
strategy is clear when compared with his earlier speech about “a few female tears, 
stronger than any acid.” When Amanda asks him what he has proved, Adam replies, “It 
shows the score.”  
Adam’s tears are the final demonstration that the couple’s marriage exemplifies 
egalitarianism. Beauvoir writes, “One often speaks of the naïve and loyal man’s 
disillusionment in the face of feminine perfidy . . . man criticizes women for their 
duplicity, but he must be very complacent to let himself be duped with so much 
constancy” (Beauvoir, 512). Adam has made it clear that a marriage based on equality 
means that “feminine duplicity” must be an acceptable tool for him to use as well, so that 
neither “masculine brutality” nor “feminine tears” come under the “exclusive province of 
any one sex.” “There is no difference between the sexes. Men, women, the same,” 
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Amanda exclaims after Adam’s tearful performance, though she adds, “Well, maybe 
there is a difference, but it’s a little difference.” Adam replies, “Well, you know what the 
French say...Vive la difference.” Amanda asks the meaning of the phrase, which Adam 
translates as “Hooray for that little difference,” and the film concludes with the couple 
retiring to bed together. 
 Cavelle (1981) argues that Amanda not knowing what the French words mean is 
inconceivable, and that what she is actually asking is “what difference is meant by that 
little difference” (122). According to Cavelle, Adam’s Rib is the most explicit example of 
what he terms a “comedy of equality.”  He writes, “A working title for this structure 
might be ‘the comedy of equality,’ evoking laughter at the idea that men and women are 
different and at the idea that they are not” (Cavelle, 122). However, the conclusion the 
film seems to offer is that a “little difference” is necessary in order for marriage to 
operate smoothly.  
Adam’s earlier insistence that he is old-fashioned and likes two sexes, and Amanda’s 
ambivalence when she states that men and women are really the same seem to suggest 
that neither would be happy without at least a little bit of typically masculine and 
typically feminine behaviors. Whether these behaviors are manufactured or innate, the 
film seems to suggest that they are necessary for a happy marriage, and although they can 
be utilized effectively by either husband or wife, the relationship is much more secure 
and navigable when both stick to their prescribed roles. Thus, Amanda Bonner remains a 
happily married woman in an (almost) equal relationship. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LESBIANS? LUCY BERLINER, SYDNEY, AND AMY JOLLY 
Lucy Berliner and Sydney  
Beauvoir’s chapter “The Lesbian” provokes mixed reactions for a number of reasons. 
Altman (2007) writes,  
Many U.S. lesbian feminists  have found Beauvoir's lesbian chapter problematic since 
the 1970s: it provides no ‘positive role models,’ contains stereotypes, includes 
biologistic explanations, and appears to rely on problematic authorities, such as the 
discredited and rather bizarre early Freudian sexologist Wilhelm Stekel, author of the 
international bestseller The Frigid Woman. (Altman, 209) 
 
Altman (2009) also notes, “I also had a deep suspicion of seeing lesbians marshaled as 
symbols in the texts of straight women” (Altman, 209). However, Altman’s statement 
immediately raises a question of which Altman herself is aware: Was Beauvoir really a 
“straight” woman? Did she not, in fact, have sexual relationships with women such as her 
lover and adopted daughter Sylvie Le Bon (Simons, 1992)?  Is the desire to affix an 
“accurate” label to Beauvoir’s own sexuality in order to frame her analyses in “The 
Lesbian” not significant in its own right?  
 Noting these and other questions concerning Beauvoir’s own sexual relationships and 
preferences, Altman (2009) concludes, 
What else can one reasonably say?—that she had a number of very important loving 
relationships with women early and late in life, which may or may not have been 
sexual; that she had sexual contact with women, at least through the early1940s, in 
ways that may or may not have been loving; that she never said she was a lesbian; 
and that she had her homophobic moments—like most people. (Altman, 211) 
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Butler (1990) is also acutely aware of the problems that surround the question of what it 
means to theorize as a lesbian and, more fundamentally, what it means to “be” a lesbian 
at all when referring to one’s own identity in whole or in part (Butler, 120).  
 Explaining how “gayness” requires both production and performance, Butler (1990) 
writes,  
When I spoke at the conference on homosexuality in 1989, I found myself telling my 
friends beforehand that I was off to Yale to be a lesbian, which of course didn’t mean 
that I wasn’t one before, but that somehow then, as I spoke in that context, I was one 
in some more thorough and totalizing way . . . When and where does my being a 
lesbian come into play, when and where does this playing a lesbian constitute 
something like what I am? (Butler, 124-125) 
 
These questions about what it means to categorize the sexuality of any individual, 
whether fictional or “real,” apply when attempting to pin the identity of “lesbian” on the 
main characters of the film High Art, director and writer Lisa Cholodenko’s first feature 
film. The lesbian element in High Art is not intended to be the main focus of the film, as 
Cholodenko herself states in an interview with Earls (1998): “I think there's certainly a 
lesbian element to it, and there's certainly a central lesbian relationship, but I specifically 
wrote it to be much more complex than that”  (Earls, 28).  
 High Art (the name of the film is an allusion to the prominent role of the drug heroin 
in the plot) is indeed more complex than a film about lesbian identity politics. Sydney or 
“Syd” (Radha Mitchell) is an assistant editor for the tragically hip photography magazine 
Frame. Despite her title and her degree in critical theory, however, Syd is treated as more 
of an errand girl who is responsible for tasks such as bringing her supervising editor 
Harry (David Thornton) coffee and scones. The way Syd is treated at work is a point of 
contention between her and her live-in boyfriend James (Gabriel Mann), who complains 
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that she is bullied and scolds her for not standing up for herself. “The only one bullying 
me is you,” Syd replies gently (High Art, 1998).  
Syd’s lackluster routine is immediately contrasted with the life of Lucy Berliner (Ally 
Sheedy). The next scene is of Lucy’s girlfriend Greta, a German actress discovered by 
Rainer Werner Fassbinder, snorting heroin in the bathroom of a restaurant. When she 
joins Lucy again at their table and is so high she has difficulty speaking clearly, Lucy is 
not pleased. “I thought you said you weren’t going to bring that here,” Lucy exclaims, 
and her irritation is evident (High Art, 1998). Each of these women is the polar opposite 
of stereotypical notions of “butch” lesbians. Beauvoir writes,  
People are always ready to see the lesbian as wearing a felt hat, her hair short, and a 
necktie; her mannishness is seen as an abnormality indicating a hormonal imbalance. 
Nothing could be more erroneous that this confusion of the homosexual and virago. 
There are many homosexual women among odalisques, courtesans, and the most 
deliberately ‘feminine’ women. (Beauvoir, 417)    
 
Syd is young, blonde, fresh-faced, feminine, and beautiful. Both Greta and Lucy are older 
than Syd, but although Greta’s beauty is muted by her constant state of heroin-induced 
stupor, she is also feminine, stylish, and beautiful, as is the more androgynously dressed 
Lucy. Despite their beauty and femininity, however, none of the three women convey the 
vampish and overtly sexualized stereotype of what Bell, Binnie, Cream, and Valentine 
(1994) identify as “lipstick” lesbians.  
 Syd’s romantic relationship with a man also makes it difficult to classify her 
according to lesbian stereotypes. According to Beauvoir, “The lesbian is characterized 
simply by her refusal of the male and her preference for feminine flesh” (Beauvoir, 419). 
Syd, however, is characterized by her seemingly ordinary (even boring) life that consists 
of by mundane problems and activities. As Syd reads in the bathtub, she notices the 
 
 
72 
 
ceiling of her bathroom has begun to leak, and after unsuccessfully trying to contact the 
landlord, she goes to her upstairs neighbor’s apartment in hopes of finding the source of 
the problem. Instead, she finds Lucy and Greta, who are both snorting heroin in their 
living room when Syd knocks on their door.  
When Lucy answers the door and tells Syd that no one in the apartment has taken a 
bath recently, Syd is clearly taken aback by the oddness of her reply, but she immediately 
forgets that something seems amiss when she becomes entranced by the photographs 
covering Lucy’s walls especially when she learns that Lucy herself has taken them. Syd 
returns to her own apartment and recounts her experience to a disinterested James, and 
receives a similar response when she attempts to tell Harry about Lucy’s photographs at 
work. When she mentions that she knows of a photographer the magazine might be 
interested in, Harry flippantly replies, “What’s his name?” However, he agrees to look at 
Lucy’s work and instructs Syd to bring in a sample.  
Syd’s relationships with both James and Harry, the only two men she consistently 
interacts with throughout the film, seem tedious and unsatisfying. Both men seem to 
subtly treat her as a subordinate, and neither seems to take her opinions seriously. Their 
attitudes stand in contrast to Lucy’s, who seems to genuinely appreciate Syd’s analysis of 
her photographic style when she again uses the excuse of the leaky ceiling to return to 
Lucy’s apartment. Harry and James both seem more aggressive than Syd, who seems to 
passively (though wearily) accept their behavior with an attitude that borders on 
meekness.  
Passivity is a character trait that Lucy’s own mother criticizes her of displaying, 
although it is clear that she uses it as a code for Lucy’s lesbianism. In a scene in which 
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Lucy confronts her mother about her large credit card bill, her mother scolds her for 
being “passive” and failing to uphold the responsibility of carrying on the family name. 
Beauvoir writes,  
According to Jones and Hesnard, lesbians mostly fall into two categories: ‘masculine 
lesbians,’ who ‘try to act like men,’ and ‘feminine’ ones, who ‘are afraid of men.’ It is 
a fact that one can, on the whole observe two tendencies in homosexual women; some 
refuse passivity, while others choose to lose themselves passively in feminine arms; 
but these two attitudes react upon each other reciprocally . . . For numerous reasons, 
as we shall see, the distinction given seems quite arbitrary. (Beauvoir, 420)  
 
As I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, Beauvoir argues that woman, whatever 
her choice of sexual object, is always constructed as immanent, passive, and inert. 
Though it comes from her clearly old-fashioned mother, the suggestion that Lucy’s 
lesbianism is a result of passivity is a common one. The scene also reveals Lucy’s 
mother’s disapproval of Greta, and that Lucy comes from an extremely wealthy family. 
“I’m not worried,” her mother replies to Lucy’s questions about the credit card bill. 
Though Lucy and Syd may share passivity in common, the exchange between Lucy and 
her mother seems to suggest that the comparison ends there. The two come from different 
worlds, though they share their present location in common. 
Minutes before Syd knocks on Lucy’s door for the second time, Lucy and Greta are 
once again snorting heroin. The two begin to engage in hazy and passionate foreplay, 
which Syd interrupts when she knocks on the door. Though Lucy is clearly pleased to see 
Syd again, Greta’s irritation is evident. When she introduces herself to Syd, she tells her, 
“I’m Greta. I live for Lucy. I mean, I live here with Lucy” (High Art, 1998). Greta’s 
statement, which she thinly disguises as a momentary lapse in her English skills, is 
clearly intentional. Greta is both jealous of Syd and suspicious of her interest in Lucy, 
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fearing that she only wants to use Lucy as a means to furthering her own career. 
According to Beauvoir, “. . . the woman who regards herself as object sees herself and 
her fellow creatures as prey” (Beauvoir, 419), and Greta certainly seems to regard Lucy 
as such. However, Lucy does not share Greta’s suspicion, and she gives Syd a book of 
her photography to show her superiors at Frame, although she warns her that the book is 
“really old.”  
When Syd shows the book of Lucy’s photos to Harry and executive editor 
Dominique, she discovers that Lucy’s world was once very different indeed. Dominique 
explains that ten years previously, Lucy was extremely well-known in the art world but 
abruptly withdrew herself from it and fled New York for Germany without any apparent 
reason. “A real ‘fuck you’ to everyone who helped her come up. You know, that was it—
no explanations, nothing,” Dominique explains. When Dominique demands to know why 
she was not informed that Lucy had returned to New York, Harry replies as though Syd 
had failed to tell him, making her appear incompetent. Nevertheless, Syd promises to set 
up a lunch date with Lucy, Dominique, and Harry in order to offer her the cover of 
Frame.  
The information Syd discovers about Lucy’s past only serves to make Lucy appear 
even more fascinating and enigmatic. After sending James off by himself to spend the 
evening with friends the two of them had planned to meet, Syd once again returns to 
Lucy’s apartment. Several of Lucy’s and Greta’s friends are also there, and everyone is 
getting high in the living room. Syd accepts a line of heroin though it is clear she has 
never done the drug before, raising the question of just how far she might go in order to 
convince Lucy to shoot the cover of the magazine. Syd returns home and attempts to 
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initiate sex with the sleeping James, who is furious when he discovers that she has done 
heroin. “Is that what’s so fascinating upstairs?” he asks, and Syd responds by telling him 
he is being “uptight.”  
Comparing lesbians’ treatment of women with that of men’s, Beauvoir writes, “They 
detest their power over women, they detest the ‘soiling’ to which they subject women” 
(Beauvoir, 435). Beauvoir’s observation clearly does not apply to Lucy, however, who 
seems to relish initiating the younger, more naïve Syd into her world of heroin chic and 
the bohemian lifestyle. When Syd returns to Lucy’s apartment the next day to convince 
Lucy to meet with Dominique and Harry, she finally hears Lucy’s explanation for 
abruptly ending her career as a photographer. “I stopped working ten years ago. It was 
kind of a mental health decision. Actually, no, it wasn’t a decision. I just made it 
impossible for myself to continue,” Lucy tells her (High Art, 1998). Lucy also claims she 
could not tolerate having her work “pigeonholed” by the industry.  
Though Lucy is reluctant at first, again explaining that she no longer does “industry 
work,” Syd eventually convinces her to meet with Harry and Dominique. Lucy playfully 
asks Syd if she can take pictures of her, an idea Syd dismisses without much 
consideration. During the lunch with Harry and Dominique, however, Lucy states that 
she will only agree to shoot the cover if Syd can be her personal editor. Lucy’s motives 
for requesting Syd as her editor are clear to the viewer. She is both attracted to and 
fascinated by her. However, it is clear that Dominique and Harry interpret Lucy’s request 
as orchestrated by Syd in order to further her career at Frame despite Syd’s obvious 
surprise at the situation.  
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Later in the evening, Syd again makes it clear to James that working with Lucy is not 
about furthering her own career. James comments that perhaps she will finally get a raise 
for securing the deal for the cover with Lucy, but Syd explains that “It’s not about a 
raise” (High Art, 1998). Though Syd clearly does want to further her career, her interest 
in Lucy and her art also seems evident. However, even Lucy sees Syd’s ambitiousness. 
Syd once again goes to Lucy’s for a party, this time bringing James with her. Leaving 
James on his own to mingle, Syd wanders off to the bedroom to get high once again with 
Lucy.  
The two are on the bed together, and the atmosphere between them is intimate and 
sexually charged. “That’s a wonderful thing about you—your ambition, your focus, your 
drive. I really love having that around me again. I didn’t know how much I missed it,” 
Lucy tells Syd (High Art, 1998). When Syd replies that she “can’t believe” Lucy 
requested Syd for her editor at the lunch appointment, Lucy asks, “That’s what you want, 
isn’t it?” Lucy and Syd then share their first kiss, again raising the question of how far 
Syd will go to make sure that Lucy will follow through with shooting the cover. As 
previously mentioned, Syd’s claims that her interest in Lucy’s work is about more than 
securing a raise seem genuine. However, Syd’s decision to do heroin and her willingness 
to be physically intimate with Lucy raise the question of whether she is only playing a 
role to get closer to Lucy and gain her trust. 
Lucy’s and Syd’s first kiss is interrupted by Lucy’s friend and dealer, who bursts into 
the bedroom to tell Lucy that Greta has overdosed and is unconscious in the bathtub. 
Though Syd performs CPR and revives Greta, the minute she regains consciousness, she 
begins screaming obscenities at Syd and insisting that she leave. When Syd returns home, 
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her clothes soaked from pulling Greta out of the bathtub to resuscitate her, James 
demands to know if she had been taking a bath with Lucy. He is angry that Syd 
abandoned him in a roomful of strangers to spend time with Lucy at the party, and he is 
also clearly jealous.  
James’s jealousy is only trumped Greta’s. When Lucy confronts Greta about her 
overdose the night before, Greta deflects her concern and instead complains about Syd, 
insisting that she is a “sycophant” and a “parasite,” and that Lucy is simply blind to her 
true motives. Beauvoir writes, 
Women among themselves are pitiless; they foil, provoke, chase, attack, and lead 
each other on to the limits of abjection . . . their patience in endlessly going over 
criticisms and explanations is insatiable. Demands, recriminations, jealousy, 
tyranny—all these plagues of conjugal life pour out in heightened form. (Beauvoir, 
433) 
 
Though Beauvoir’s description above of how women treat other women may be 
applicable in many instances, Greta’s attitude towards Syd is justified. She is, after all, 
Lucy’s partner of several years. She “lives” for her, as she tells Syd earlier in the film. 
Not only is Syd the “younger woman,” she has obviously piqued Lucy’s interest, and the 
two share a bond that Greta and Lucy do not: Lucy’s art.  
 After Lucy’s confrontation with Greta, Syd arrives at her apartment to remind her of 
the deadline for the cover, and is dismayed when Lucy rejects her idea to reserve a room 
at the Chelsea Hotel in order to begin working on something immediately. “I don’t work 
that way. I don’t set things up,” Lucy reminds her. Syd becomes even more panicked 
when Lucy tells her she needs to leave town and head upstate, but when Lucy asks that 
she come with her, Syd agrees. Syd’s willingness to accompany Lucy on what appears to 
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be a romantic getaway seems to suggest that she would go to any lengths in order to 
ensure that Lucy completes the cover of the magazine.  
 When Syd informs James that she is leaving town with Lucy, he demands to know if 
she is sleeping with her. When she assures him that she is not, he asks if she is “working 
up to it.” James has clearly had enough, and he makes his opinion on Syd’s motives clear: 
“I guess you’re really at the center of it all now, aren’t you? Got your power job, and 
your hipster friends, and all that access. I mean, this is the real shit. It’s just what you 
wanted,” he tells her (High Art, 1998). However, Syd once again seems to demonstrate 
that her fascination with Lucy is about more than furthering her career. Echoing Lucy’s 
feelings on her experience with fame and working in the industry, Syd accuses James of 
being fixated on “pigeonholing” her and “putting her in a box.”  
 When James demands to know what Syd means by her statement, she defends herself 
for the first time in a manner that is far from passive:  
It means that no matter what I do, you can’t stop telling me it’s wrong. I mean, I’m 
trying to get somewhere, and all I get from you are these slurs about my job, and the 
people that I’ve met, and how pretentious and meaningless and idiotic it all is, and 
you know what? It’s not meaningless to me. This is what I care about. What do you 
care about, James? (High Art, 1998) 
 
While Syd is delivering her passionate monologue to James, Lucy is in a restaurant with 
Greta, who is so high that the waitress has warned her that they will be asked to leave if 
she can’t stay awake. It is the breaking point for Lucy, who tells Greta that she can no 
longer tolerate her addiction, and that she needs to seek help. “Look at yourself, Lucy,” 
Greta replies.  
 The confrontations with both Greta and James set the stage for Lucy’s and Syd’s trip 
upstate together. Both of them are now more “free” to pursue each other in the sense of 
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having dealt with their less that satisfying partners. However, instead of continuing the 
dynamic of joining in with Lucy when she escapes via heroin, Syd refuses to partake, 
telling Lucy she does not want the drug to be their only connection. “I don’t want to be 
with you like that right now,” she says (High Art, 1998). Syd’s refusal to get high with 
Lucy seems to confirm that she has not accompanied her solely for the sake of overseeing 
the cover project. She wants to remain connected with Lucy rather than escaping into a 
heroin-induced haze. Once again, Lucy asks Syd if she can photograph her, and it is clear 
that Syd is uncomfortable with the idea.  
 Just before the two finally have sex for the first time, Syd tearfully tells Lucy, “I think 
I’m kind of in love with you” (High Art, 1998). Syd’s awkwardness is both touching and 
endearing. “I don’t really know what I’m doing,” she tells Lucy. Only after they have 
shared this intimate experience does Syd agree to let Lucy photograph her. Describing the 
particular character of intimacy between two women, Beauvoir writes,  
Eroticism often has only a very small part in these unions; sexual pleasure has a less 
striking character, less dizzying than between man and woman, it does not lead to 
such overwhelming metamorphoses; but when male and female lovers have separated 
into their individual flesh, they become strangers again . . . between women, carnal 
tenderness is more equal, continuous, they are not transported in frenetic ecstasy, they 
never fall into hostile indifference; seeing and touching each other are calm pleasures 
discreetly prolonging those of the bed. (Beauvoir, 432-433) 
 
Though Syd is agreeing to be Lucy’s subject, she is actually submitting to be object. 
However, it is a “safe” submission, one that, as Beauvoir states above, will not render her 
and Lucy strangers even after she has given herself.  
Remarking on lesbians who assume what Beauvoir labels a “masculine attitude,” she 
writes, “What is spontaneous is the conquering and sovereign subject’s shame at the idea 
of changing into a carnal prey” (Beauvoir, 423).  That women are passive prey is, again, 
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the result of their situation as immanent beings. Of women who adopt masculine attitudes 
regardless of their sexual orientation, Beauvoir writes,  
Even if she has a good figure and is pretty, the woman who is involved in her own 
projects or who claims her freedom in general refuses to abdicate in favor of another 
human being; she recognizes herself in her acts, not in her immanent presence . . . she 
feels the same disgust for her submissive female companions as the virile man feels 
for the passive homosexual (Beauvoir, 422-423) 
 
Both Lucy and Syd are involved in their own projects, and both claim their own freedom, 
though the act of doing so seems much more difficult for Syd. Despite Beauvoir’s 
sometimes questionable terminology and assumptions throughout “The Lesbian,” her 
main argument is that “masculine behavior” is in fact “virile behavior,” and that any 
subjects who posit themselves as transcendent beings will act in a virile manner 
regardless of their sexual orientation (Beauvoir, 423).   
 Whether or not “carnal tenderness” is truly more equal between women as Beauvoir 
claims (Beauvoir, 432-433), the bond Lucy and Syd share is based on more than the 
bonds they share with Greta and James. Lucy finds Syd’s youth and ambition both 
refreshing and revitalizing, and Syd finds in Lucy someone who exemplifies the talent 
her life is centered upon as well as someone who can truly understand her passion for the 
artistic world. However, when the two return to the city, Syd is still left empty-handed, 
with no completed cover to submit to Dominique and Harry.  
 Syd arrives home to find a note from James saying he has gone to stay with friends. 
After Lucy visits her mother again and explains that both her love life and her drug use 
have become a problem, she goes to Syd’s apartment for the first time in the film. Syd 
confides in her that James will not return her calls, and begs Lucy to give her photos of 
Greta she had taken in the past in order to meet the deadline and satisfy Dominique and 
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Harry. Lucy refuses, and instead gives Syd the pictures she took of her during their time 
together upstate. Syd is completely taken aback: “I’m naked in all of them,” she protests, 
but whether she is really referring to her naked body, her naked ambition, or her passion 
for Lucy is unclear.  
 Lucy finally relents and gives Syd the pictures of Greta to take to Dominique and 
Harry, although she warns Syd that the pictures of her would be better. “It’s all about you 
right now,” Lucy tells her, and she is correct. When Syd shows the photos to Dominique 
and Harry, they are furious with the lack of quality and context and threaten to call off the 
deal for the cover. In a desperate attempt to salvage the situation, Syd privately shows 
Dominique the pictures Lucy had taken of her during their time upstate. Dominique 
demands to know why Syd did not show her the pictures initially, and Syd replies that 
she did not feel they were “appropriate.”  
 Dominique also demands to know whether the photos are meant to be a critique by 
Syd. “It’s not a critique, it’s just what happened,” Syd explains. Dominique then demands 
to know whether Syd is Lucy’s sitter or her lover. Though Dominique is the executive 
editor and certainly entitled to know the details of important projects, her insistence on 
classifying Syd and Lucy’s relationship also seems to echo the theme of labels and 
pigeonholing. Beauvoir acknowledges that affixing labels to sexuality is often a 
meaningless task. She writes,  
For all these reasons, it is wrong to establish a radical distinction between 
heterosexual and homosexual. Once the indecisive tune if adolescence has passed, the 
normal male no longer allows himself homosexual peccadilloes; but the normal 
woman often returns to the lovers—platonic or not—that enchanted her youth. 
(Beauvoir, 431) 
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Meaningless or not, however, the desire to categorize sexual orientation is 
overwhelmingly pervasive as the discussion at the beginning of this chapter of Beauvoir’s 
own sexuality indicates.  
 High Art ends tragically. When Lucy returns from another trip upstate, this time 
presumably to fully detoxify herself from heroin, she confronts Greta yet again and 
informs her that she can no longer live with her. Greta begs Lucy to be with her on her 
own “level” one last time, and the two spend the evening doing heroin together. On her 
way to work the next morning, Syd encounters a friend of Lucy’s who tells her Lucy had 
died from an overdose hours before. Syd is devastated, and when she arrives at work, the 
new issue of Frame has arrived, featuring her own image on the cover, naked, tousled, 
and in bed. Syd is exposed not only in the sense that her face is on the cover of the 
magazine, but also because her motives for her relationship with Lucy are now on display 
for all to see, and are subject to questions and speculations.  
 One might be tempted to argue that Syd was not a “real” lesbian. At least, not in the 
same way Lucy and Greta were “real” lesbians, just as one might argue that Beauvoir 
herself was not a “real” lesbian. Beauvoir is aware of the absurdity of such 
classifications, however: 
In truth, homosexuality is no more a deliberate perversion than a fatal curse. It is an 
attitude that is chosen in situation; it is both motivated and freely adopted . . . It is one 
way among others for woman to solve the problems posed by her condition in general 
and by her erotic situation in particular. (Beauvoir, 436)  
 
For Beauvoir, all sexuality is “chosen in situation” (Beauvoir, 436). The question of 
whether sexuality “motivated” or “freely adopted” is nonsensical, because it is always 
both, regardless of whether the end result falls under the label of a homo or heterosexual 
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relationship. Syd chooses to love Lucy as a result of her situation, but her love is 
authentic in that she and Lucy are both subjects. They are true lovers regardless of 
whether they can be pigeonholed as “true” lesbians. 
 
Amy Jolly 
  
Despite the absurdity of attempting to define what constitutes a “real” lesbian, the 
character of Amy Jolly (Marlene Dietrich) in Morocco (1930) is often read as 
heterosexual. What sets Morocco apart from High Art (1998) and the other films 
discussed in this thesis is that a single provocative scene takes primary importance over 
all other plot developments with regard to the character of Amy Jolly and lesbianism. The 
majority of this chapter is an analysis of that scene and a discussion of its various 
interpretations, as well as representations of homosexuality in general in films released 
under the Hollywood Production Code. 
 Amy Jolly is a French singer caught between the amorous attentions of two men, La 
Bessière (Adolphe Menjou) and Tom Brown (Gary Cooper). La Bessière is a high class, 
wealthy, and cultured European gentleman, while Tom Brown is a younger man and a 
Foreign Legionnaire. In the famous drag scene, however, it is Tom who receives Amy’s 
attention, though not until after her famous kiss with the female audience member. 
Dressed in a top hat and tuxedo, Amy comes down from the stage and into the audience 
to perform the song. She is smoking a cigarette, and the way she holds it is unmistakably 
masculine, as is her swagger and the way she hitches up the leg of her tuxedo pants to 
perch on the rail separating the stage from the rest of the cabaret.   
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When Amy has finished singing, a man sitting at a table with another couple offers 
her a glass of champagne. She accepts it, and then strolls around to stand in front of the 
woman sitting next to him. She drains the glass of champagne, looks at the woman, and 
then does a sharp double-take, as if the woman’s beauty has captivated her. She boldly 
stares at the woman, who is giggling and flustered by the attention. “May I have this?” 
Amy asks, removing a flower from behind the woman’s ear. “Of course,” the woman 
replies. Amy smells the flower, then lifts the woman’s chin and kisses her square on the 
mouth while the woman’s companions and the rest of the audience in the cabaret laugh 
uproariously. Amy flicks the brim of her top hat in a roguish mock salute, another bold 
and masculine gesture, then strolls over to Tom, who stands up to applaud her. She tosses 
him the flower much to the annoyance of his female companion, then swaggers back up 
to the stage, her hands in her pants pockets.  
Though, as previously mentioned, the rest of Morocco’s (1930) plot centers around 
Amy deciding between the affections of La Bessière and Tom Brown, this one iconic 
scene is the subject of wealth of scholarship dealing with what appear to be allusions to 
homosexuality in movies subjected to the censorship of the Hollywood Production Code. 
Though the sex scenes featuring Lucy, Greta, and Syd in High Art (1998) are by no 
means gratuitous, such obvious depictions of homosexuality were clearly prohibited in 
movies subject to the Production Code because they constituted “deviant behavior.”   
Though the Production Code has not been in effect since 1960, Jenkins (2005) points 
out that obvious portrayals of lesbian sexuality are still a relatively new phenomenon in 
movies and a variety of other media: 
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In the last eight years, however, lesbian sexuality has become more explicitly 
manifest in mainstream film, and since the debut of the August 1993 issue of Vanity 
Fair, which features Cindy Crawford erotically shaving country singer k.d. lang, 
several critics have marked a trend in popular culture that promotes the idea that 
‘lesbian sexuality is hot.’ (Jenkins, 491) 
 
Recent popular culture may reflect a trend towards promoting lesbian sexuality as “hot” 
rather than an unacceptable manifestation of deviant behavior, Amy Jolly’s drag 
performance seems to suggest that hints of lesbianism have been used to titillate movie 
audiences for decades. 
In addition to the regulatory force of the Production Code and its prohibitions against 
blatant depictions of homosexuality, Wilton (1995) argues that lesbian sexuality had to 
remain invisible because the success of Hollywood stars such as Dietrich depended on 
their image as straight sex symbols. Citing Wilton (1995), Jenkins (2005) writes,  
Wilton posits that despite the odd cinematic lesbian moments, such as when Greta 
Garbo kisses her maid servant in Queen Christina or Marlene Dietrich kisses a female 
night clubber in Morocco, lesbian sexuality in the starlet era has remained invisible 
primarily because the actresses who comprise the pantheon of early Hollywood 
goddesses were conferred their immortality precisely as heterosexual icons. (Jenkins, 
491).  
 
Russo (1987), however, argues that Hollywood allows for many incarnations of “real” 
women, but only one type of “real” man is permissible, and that the famous drag scene in 
Morocco (1930) only serves to enhance the image of Gary Cooper’s masculinity:  
There could be all kinds of women who were considered ‘real’ women, to be 
manipulated sexually for maximum fantasy appeal to men, but there could be only 
one kind of real man, with no deviation allowed. In Morocco, Dietrich’s intentions 
are clearly heterosexual; the brief hunt of lesbianism she exhibits serves only to make 
her more exotic, to whet Gary Cooper’s appetite for her and to further challenge his 
maleness. (Russo, 14) 
 
Russo (1987) also notes that, although the Hollywood Production Code was in effect 
when Morocco was released, representations of homosexuality are still present in films 
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made during the Code years, although they are often couched in other imagery (Russo, 
30). 
Beauvoir also notes that only one kind of “real man” is permissible as evident in 
cultural attitudes toward homosexual men: “The homosexual man inspires hostility from 
male and female heterosexuals as they both demand that man be a dominating subject; by 
contrast, both sexes spontaneously view lesbians with indulgence” (Beauvoir, 419). She 
provides an example of the intolerance of homosexual men in a juridical context, noting 
that “English law punishes homosexuality in men while not considering it a crime for 
women” (Beauvoir, 420n), though English law would decriminalize homosexuality in 
1967 (Weeks, 1980), nearly twenty years after the first edition of The Second Sex was 
published.  
Russo’s (1987) analysis of Amy’s lesbian performance as a titillating test of Tom 
Brown’s masculinity also seems to resemble Beauvoir’s discussion of what she terms 
“show-off zealots” (Beauvoir, 435). Despite Beauvoir’s assertion that it is wrong to draw 
sharp distinctions between heterosexuality and homosexuality as cited in the previous 
section, she nevertheless delivers a scathing criticism of women she appears to consider 
faux-lesbians: 
It must be added that many women only declare themselves homosexual out of self-
interest: they adopt equivocal appearances with exaggerated consciousness, hoping to 
catch men who like ‘perverts.’ These show-off zealots—who are obviously those one 
notices most—contribute to throwing discredit on what public opinion considers a 
vice and a pose. (Beauvoir, 435)  
 
As much as Amy’s drag performance can be considered just that—a performance—
Beauvoir’s accusation of adopting the guise of the lesbian in a self-interested attempt to 
attract men seems to apply. Yet, in the above quote, Beauvoir also notes that such a guise 
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“discredits” the public stance on lesbianism as intolerable deviance, and the favorable 
reception of Amy Jolly’s performance seems to as well.  
  Smelik (1999) demonstrates that, regardless of the remainder of Morocco’s (1930) 
plot, Amy Jolly’s performance can still be received as homoerotic and enjoyed by lesbian 
spectators:  
Amy Jolly inverts the heterosexual order of seducer and seduced, while her lesbian 
flirtation and her butch image make the scene even more subversive. However 
fleeting and transitory such moments may be in classical cinema, Dietrich's star 
persona allows the lesbian spectator a glimpse of homoerotic enjoyment. (Smelik, 
362) 
 
However, as Russo (1987) demonstrates, no parallel dynamic seems to exist for 
depictions of male homosexuality in popular Hollywood film. Though some imagery 
such as male cross-dressing seems to clearly convey male homosexuality, the 
associations are almost never positive (Russo, 31).  
In addition to cross-dressing, Russo (1987) points out other more subtle 
representations during the pre-Code years: 
But while censorship laws were becoming more specific and explicit homosexuality 
remained a forbidden subject in every statute, it was clear that cross dressing, 
weakness in men and overintellectualism were sometimes direct statements about 
deviant sexuality. And whether expressed directly or not, the classic definition of 
homosexual men as frivolous, asexual sissies was firmly established during the last of 
the pre-Code years. (Russo, 31) 
 
Russo (1987) also notes that negative public sentiment concerning lesbianism was also a 
common public sentiment, such as the use of the term “disgusting perverts” by a film 
critic for a 1926 issue of Photoplay in reference to the “vaguely lesbian” spy featured in 
Rex Ingram’s Mare Nostrum (Russo, 30).  Again, however, as Beauvoir and other 
previously cited authors argue, such negative sentiments regarding homosexuality are at 
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odds with actual behavior, including the favorable reception of Amy Jolly’s drag 
performance by audiences both past and present. 
 Given the many readings of Amy Jolly’s drag performance discussed in this section, 
the question of whether or not she is a “true” lesbian is much more difficult since, as 
Smelik (1999) observes, the sexuality of the spectator is often more significant than the 
plot of a movie itself (Smelik, 362). In her discussion of drag, Butler (1990) writes,  
I do not mean to suggest that drag is a ‘role’ that can be taken on or taken off at will. 
There is no volitional subject behind the mime who decides, as it were, which gender 
it will be today . . . In this sense, gender is not a performance that a prior subject 
elects to do, but gender is performative in the sense that it constitutes as an effect the 
very subject it appears to express. (Butler, 130) 
 
In other words, Amy Jolly’s drag performance is no more or less genuine than the role 
she performs when conveying her “real” sexuality. All gender is a performance according 
to Butler, and one that produces an illusion of authenticity only through the act of 
repetition.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Each of the female characters discussed in this thesis display characteristics of what 
Beauvoir refers to as woman’s immanence. From Bella Swan, who acts as a mediator 
between the worlds of fleshly immanence and pure masculine transcendence for her 
vampire boyfriend, to Amy Jolly, whose drag performance serves to make her more 
appealing to Tom Brown and spectators of any sexual orientation, Beauvoir’s analyses of 
women’s situations and characters are reflected in these Hollywood creations. 
Though the films discussed only represent a tiny sampling of movies produced both 
during and after the Hollywood Production Code, finding characters in popular 
Hollywood cinema that do not echo Beauvoir’s analyses of woman’s immanence is a 
difficult task. Beauvoir takes the intertexual approach of constructing the figure of 
woman by synthesizing images from history, biology, mythology, literature, and 
psychoanalysis, all of which influence the filmic history of women as well. Smelik 
(1999) notes, 
Such fixed and endlessly repeated images of women were considered to be 
objectionable distortions which would have a negative impact on the female 
spectator. Hence, the call for positive images of women in cinema. Soon, however, 
the insight dawned that positive images were not enough to change underlying 
structures in film. (Smelik, 353) 
 
The above quote from Smelik neatly summarizes what Beauvoir so painstakingly 
demonstrates in The Second Sex, and what the analyses of female characters in this thesis 
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reveals: the idea of woman is a construction woven from an all-pervasive framework that 
posits women as immanent being in both film and in actual lived experience.   
As mentioned in the Method section, the fourth step of CDA involves analyzing the 
contradictions present in Beauvoir’s discourse on woman as immanence. However, 
Smelik (1999) points out that a feminist analysis of film must acknowledge a theoretical 
contradiction of feminism itself:  
We witness a theoretical contradiction of feminism here: while feminists need to 
deconstruct the patriarchal images and representations of 'Woman', they historically 
need to establish their female subjectivity at the same time. That is to say, they have 
to find out and redefine what it means to be a woman. A relentless formalism may be 
too much of a one-sided approach to the complex enterprise of (re)constructing the 
female subject. (Smelik, 354) 
 
Smelik’s (1999) acknowledgement of the theoretical contradiction of feminism echoes 
Beauvoir’s statement in the Introduction in which she explains that the first thing she 
realized she must do in order to speak about herself is to declare that she is in fact a 
woman, and then to define what it means to make such a declaration, which is the 
purpose of The Second Sex itself.  
 Feminism has achieved significant victories since Beauvoir wrote The Second Sex, 
yet one need look no further than the following quote to see that negative notions of 
femininity still pervade representations of women in a variety of cultural forms: 
We can now understand why, from ancient Greece to today, there are so many 
common features in the indictments against woman; her condition has remained the 
same throughout superficial changes, and this condition defines what is called the 
woman’s ‘character’: she ‘wallows in immanence,’ she is argumentative, she is 
cautious and petty, she does not have the sense either of truth or of accuracy, she 
lacks morality, she is vulgarly self-serving, selfish, she is a liar and an actress. There 
is some truth is all these affirmations. (Beauvoir, 638) 
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Given Beauvoir’s description of women’s character in the above quote, it is not 
surprising that in an interview with Beauvoir, Brison (2003) notes that, despite 
Beauvoir’s exhaustive analysis of women’s situation as immanent beings, positive 
conceptions of femininity are scarce in The Second Sex (Brison, 189).  
Brison (2003) repeats a question Beauvoir herself posed to Sartre, which Brison 
(2003) feels he avoided: “Should women reject the masculine universe or should they 
find themselves a place in it?” (Brison, 189) Beauvoir replies,  
I think feminists, at least those I’m involved with, want to change not only women’s 
situation but also the world. That is, these are women who would like to see a certain 
dismantling of society and who think that if feminism were victorious, if the 
oppression of women were completely eliminated, well, society would be shaken to 
its foundation  . . . So, it’s a matter not of women taking men’s place in this world, 
but of their being emancipated in such a way as to simultaneously change this world. 
(Brison, 189) 
 
So for Beauvoir, nothing short of the complete restructuring of society is necessary in 
order for women to exist as transcendent subjects. Simply assuming men’s place is to live 
inauthentically as well, since men fail to acknowledge their own immanence according to 
Beauvoir (Beauvoir, 16).  Beauvoir’s analyses of women’s situations and characters in 
The Second Sex apply to representations of women in nearly any medium precisely 
because the category of woman is multi-layered and all-encompassing. On using the 
existing tools of the “masculine universe” such as psychoanalysis, science, and a variety 
of other male-dominated fields, Beauvoir states, “You can, indeed, steal the tools and use 
them, but you have to use them carefully and, for that matter, nothing prevents you from 
changing at the same time” (Brison, 2003).  
 Brison (2003) also questions Beauvoir about another inquiry she posed to Sartre 
concerning certain positive characteristics traditionally associated with femininity:  
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It seems to me that there are also certain traditionally feminine features that ought to 
be preserved in both men and women, as you yourself say to Sartre: ‘If we consider 
ourselves as possessing certain positive qualities, isn’t it better to convey them to men 
rather than suppress them in women?’ I wonder what qualities you have in mind. 
(Brison, 191) 
 
In her response to Brison’s question, Beauvoir makes a number of compelling claims 
concerning qualities of women that appear in her analyses in The Second Sex and that 
also appear in my own analysis of the characters discussed in this thesis.  
 Demonstrating that situation above all else dictates the positive or negative aspects of 
any characteristics for Beauvoir, she replies,   
Precisely because they don’t generally have power, women don’t have the flaws that 
are linked to the possession of power . . . Women have more irony, more detachment, 
more simplicity. They play fewer roles, wear fewer masks . . . There are also qualities 
of devotion. Devotion is very dangerous because it can become a way of life and can 
devour people sometimes, but it has its good sides . . . There is often, in women, a 
kind of caring for others that is inculcated in them by education, and which should be 
eliminated when it takes the form of slavery. (Brison, 191) 
 
Devotion and caring for others is a wonderful thing according to Beauvoir, but as a way 
of life it can also consume women as the chapter “The Married Woman” and my analysis 
of Barbara Rose demonstrate. Outside of the situations Beauvoir describes in The Second 
Sex, however, caring and devotion are traits that both sexes should reflect. Beauvoir 
states, “But caring about others, the ability to give to others, to give of your time, your 
intelligence—this is something women should keep, and something that men should learn 
to acquire” (Brison, 191).  
 Like positive conceptions of femininity, examples of how women can navigate 
romantic relationships without succumbing to the situations Beauvoir describes in The 
Second Sex are also scarce. Beauvoir’s analysis of the woman in love presents many 
examples of how, in deifying the man to which she gives herself wholly, woman seeks to 
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return to the childhood state of protection where all decisions are made for her, and she is 
shielded from the risks of living itself. The fate of the woman in love is bleak; for 
woman, love is not, in Beauvoir’s terms, an intermediary between self and self, but rather 
a prison of solitude, an acceptance of her existence as forever immanent and dependent 
(Beauvoir, 707).  Love between men and women is also doomed to the same failure as 
marriage because it envelopes the general in the particular, just as the titles of “husband” 
and “wife” function to do the same (Beauvoir, 699). 
A prescription for how men must conduct themselves in order to love authentically is 
also largely absent from “The Woman in Love” chapter. Beauvoir clearly states that she 
believes Gusdorf is wrong in his assertion that men represent an indispensable 
intermediary for women in the same way women do for men (Beauvoir, 707). According 
to Beauvoir, men remain themselves even as they are revealed in the guise of another, 
and woman can only do the same if she exists for-herself rather than for-other (Beauvoir, 
707). Beauvoir appears to believe that men set the standard for equal love, but if this is 
true, it is not clear how it can be reconciled with Beauvoir’s arguments concerning the 
inauthentic life of men in which their immanence is only ever acknowledged through the 
intermediary of woman. 
 
What Happens Next? 
Though Beauvoir’s descriptions of the consequences for the woman in love are 
extensive, as is her painstaking demonstration of both women and men’s complicity in 
perpetuating the mentality that cements their inability to love each other authentically, 
she offers only glimpses of what a route of emancipatory change would entail. In 
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accordance with the fifth step of CDA, the following is an analysis of Beauvoir’s 
attempts to elucidate how widespread social change might occur with regard to women’s 
emancipation from the permanent realm of immanence.   
Only twice in “The Woman in Love” does Beauvoir offer a positive description of the 
conditions necessary for authentic love to exist between men and women. First, she 
writes, “An authentic love should take on the other’s contingence, that is, his lacks, 
limitations, and originary gratuitousness; it would claim to be not a salvation but an inter-
human relation” (Beauvoir, 694).  
Beauvoir’s second description of an authentic love is slightly more extensive:  
Authentic love must be founded on reciprocal recognition of two freedoms; each 
lover would then experience himself as himself and as the other; neither would 
abdicate his transcendence, they would not mutilate themselves; together they would 
both reveal values and ends in the world. For each of them, love would be the 
revelation of self through the gift of self and the enrichment of the universe. 
(Beauvoir, 706)  
 
Beauvoir also offers examples of women who do not suffer for the “generous mistake” of 
putting themselves entirely in another’s hands, such as the literary heroines of Heloise 
and Colette. In running the abbey, Heloise has constructed what Beauvoir terms an 
“autonomous existence” (Beauvoir, 706). Colette’s heroines have “too much pride and 
too many resources” to fall to pieces as a result of failed love (Beauvoir, 706).  
In Beauvoir’s descriptions of women who suffer for putting themselves complete in 
another’s hands, material conditions that enable self-sufficiency are necessary in order for 
women to love authentically and to avoid becoming broken when love goes awry. 
However, despite significant gains won by feminists with regard to women’s ability to 
sustain themselves financially, contemporary examples of female characters who suffer 
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annihilation of the self when love fails them are still present, such as Bella Swan. In New 
Moon (2006), the second book of the Twilight series, Edward becomes convinced that he 
must leave Forks in order to keep Bella safe from other vampires. Bella falls into a deep 
depression, during which the character Jacob Black cares for her. The tragically romantic 
notion of a woman who is falls apart without her man is clearly alive and well, as is the 
idea that only another man can take his place to protect and care for her.  
Though “happily ever after” is a trope that thrives in many genres of popular 
Hollywood film and a variety of other media, Beauvoir is deeply suspicious of what 
happiness actually means in the context of women’s situations: 
The joy that is a surge of freedom is reserved for the man; what the woman knows is 
an impression of a smiling plenitude. One understands that simple ataraxia, in her 
eyes, can be of utmost importance, as she normally lives in the tension of denial, 
recrimination, and demands . . . But it is a delusion to try to find here the true 
definition of the hidden soul of the world. Good is not; the world is not harmony, and 
no individual has a necessary place in it. (Beauvoir, 658) 
 
When the heroine of a plot lives “happily ever after,” when she walks off into the sunset, 
hand-in-hand with the man of her dreams, this “simple ataraxia” (Beauvoir, 658) is the 
answer to the question, “What happens next?”  
In Bella Swan’s case, what happens next is permanent access to Edward’s world of 
pure transcendence. In Breaking Dawn (2008), the final book in the Twilight series, Bella 
and Edward marry. She becomes pregnant, and during the birth of their half-human, half-
vampire child, Bella sustains massive blood loss and injuries, the most severe of which is 
a broken spine that would claim her life. Edward transforms her into a vampire in order 
to “save” her once again, but now she is immortal as Edward himself is, forever liberated 
from the realm of immanence. She has earned her place in Edward’s masculine world of 
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transcendence by fulfilling every role assigned to her in the feminine world of 
immanence: she has given herself to him as a wife, given herself to him sexually, and 
given him a child.   
 In Barbara Rose’s case, what happens next is an existential crisis followed by a war 
not only for the house and objects she has used to build her identity, but for her 
independence from Oliver as well. Imagine Barbara “going to pieces” without Oliver is 
difficult. She is the initiator of the split, and she has succeeded in building a successful 
business solely through her own efforts. If her story did not end with her tragic (though 
comic) death, it is easy to imagine that what happens next involves Barbara getting on 
with a better and more fulfilling life without Oliver. However, like Bella Swan, Barbara 
Rose has also fulfilled her duties in the feminine world of immanence by giving herself 
sexually, as a wife, and as a mother. She too has earned the right to posit herself as a 
transcendent subject through far more authentic means according to Beauvoir’s terms. 
Imagining Amanda Bonner “going to pieces” without Adam is also difficult. Unlike 
Barbara Rose and Oliver, Amanda is still deeply in love with Adam. However, she has a 
thriving law practice of her own, and she is highly educated, cultured, and savvy. She too 
possesses the material conditions necessary for self-sufficiency, and is involved with 
projects outside of the world of women’s immanence. Imagining Amanda experiencing 
an existential crisis like Barbara Rose’s is also difficult. Though she fulfils her wifely 
duties for Adam, she fights for her own “little causes,” causes that exist outside of her 
immanent roles. Though what happens next in Amanda’s story is the resolution of her 
conflict with Adam and a “happily ever after” of sorts, it is easy to imagine Amanda 
going on with her with her life without Adam in spite of the inevitable sadness and regret.  
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Imagining what happens next for both Tracy Lord and Sydney is somewhat more 
difficult. Tracy’s family is exceedingly wealthy, and she will never want for a way to 
meet her material needs. However, even though Tracy wants to be regarded as a human 
being rather than a goddess, it is clear that she can only find such validation in a husband 
even if he is actually the “wrong” one, as George Kittredge proved to be. If Tracy had 
married neither George nor Dexter, it is not difficult to imagine her pining away in 
privileged boredom. Resources alone are not enough to prevent “going to pieces” unless 
they are accompanied by what Beauvoir refers to as “pride” (Beauvoir, 706). 
Though Sydney has succeeded in increasing her status and career by submitting the 
photos Lucy has taken of her, in doing so, she too has sacrificed her pride. Even though 
her feelings for Lucy may have been sincere, her success is marred because it hinges 
upon what appears to be coldly ambitious manipulation, and it is all too easy to imagine 
that what happens next for Syd is the same fate Beauvoir describes for the woman in 
love.  Under the weight of her guilt and in the wake of Lucy’s tragic death, Syd might 
indeed “go to pieces.” Likewise, “going to pieces” also seems a plausible fate for Amy 
Jolly, who takes off her sandals and follows Tom Brown into the desert in devoted 
pursuit in the final scene of Morocco (1930).  
Regardless of the particular situations, characters, and even the sexuality of women in 
popular Hollywood film, Beauvoir’s descriptions of women’s immanence in The Second 
Sex are clearly visible in both pre and post-code popular Hollywood films. This does not 
suggest that the victories achieved by feminism are insignificant or that progress has not 
been made, a fact Beauvoir herself acknowledges:  
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In her interview with John Gerassi, on “The Second Sex: Twenty Five Years Later,” 
published in early 1976 . . . Beauvoir acknowledges that, increasingly, leftist groups 
‘feel compelled to keep their macho male leaders in check. That’s progress. Here in 
our newspaper, Libération, the male-oriented majority felt obliged to let a woman 
become its director. That’s progress.’ (Brison, 204) 
 
However, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, the underlying structures of 
society remain unchanged in many ways, especially with regard to women’s roles and 
characters. As a result, images of women in film remain largely unchanged as well, and 
The Second Sex remains a valuable lens through which to view them.  
 Further research using The Second Sex as a critical lens might include an analysis of 
characters in popular Hollywood films that contradict images of woman as immanent and 
display instead aspects of masculine transcendence. Such an analysis might examine any 
consequences female characters experience as a result of positing themselves as 
transcendent subjects, especially with regard to how their sexuality is conveyed. Do 
women in film experience rejection by supporting characters and “suffer” as a result of 
positing themselves as transcendent? How do depictions of romantic love differ from 
those discussed in this thesis when both men and women reflect the qualities of 
transcendence?   
Possible limitations of this thesis and any research that draws on the new English 
translation of The Second Sex derive from the criticisms of scholars such as Moi (2010), 
who argues that despite the improvements made upon Parshley’s translation, Borde and 
Malovany-Chevallier still fail to recognize many of Beauvoir’s references resulting in a 
translation no more reliable than Parshley’s:  
The translators claim that their aim was to bring ‘into English the closes version 
possible of Simone de Beauvoir’s voice, expression and mind’. . . The obsessive 
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literalism and countless errors make it no more reliable, and far less readable than 
Parshley.  (Moi, 60)   
 
In contrast to Moi’s criticisms however, Altman (2010) calls the new English translation 
of The Second Sex “a small miracle,” though she criticizes Thurman’s introduction to the 
text (Altman, 4). Additional limitations of this particular thesis may also include the 
absence of an analysis of any user-generated content such as blogs or fan websites related 
to the six films I discuss.  
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